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Few aspects of administrative law are as controversial as the major questions
doctrine—the exception to Chevron deference that bars courts from deferring to an
agency’s otherwise reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute where doing so has
extraordinary policy implications. Proponents of the major questions doctrine believe that
the nation’s most significant questions should be decided by Congress, not agencies. The
doctrine’s critics, however, counter that there is no sound reason to treat major questions
differently from ordinary questions, if such a distinction even exists. The elevation of
Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, two major proponents of the major
questions doctrine, has reignited the debate. Both the doctrine’s friends and foes expect
that the Supreme Court will soon begin more aggressively targeting major questions.
This Article, however, argues that focusing on major questions is myopic. Minor
questions—those bipartisan, “good government” policies that do not attract much
attention but that affect countless individuals in small ways—also matter. Because of
Chevron deference, Congress and the Executive Branch often have overlapping
authority to tackle such minor questions. Yet if one branch acts, that decision confers
positive externalities on the other branch: the non-acting branch benefits from a policy
it wants without having to pay for it. When incentives are structured this way,
collective-action dynamics sometimes may prevent either branch from acting. The time
thus has come to consider what this Article dubs the “minor questions doctrine”—a new
approach to deference that targets collective-action dynamics by reducing overlapping
policymaking authority over minor policies.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial features of modern administrative law is
the major questions doctrine—the rule that courts do not defer to an agency’s
otherwise reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute if the
interpretation “concerns a question of deep economic and political
significance that is central to the statutory scheme.” 1 In a series of cases, the
Supreme Court has applied the major questions doctrine to prevent agencies
from adopting policies with “extraordinary” consequences. 2
#F

$F

1 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 852, 875 (2020) (describing the major question doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, The
American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1185 (2018) (similar); Josh Blackman,
Commentary, Gridlock, 130 HARV. L. REV. 241, 261 (2016) (similar).
2 See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (rejecting an EPA
interpretation of the Clean Air Act that would “bring about an enormous and transformative
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267-68 (2006)
(rejecting a Department of Justice interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act that would have
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As one might expect, the major questions doctrine is not popular in all
circles. 3 Critics argue that there is no reason why major questions merit closer
scrutiny, 4 if, indeed, there is a reliable way to tell the difference between major
questions and regular ones. 5 Critics also worry that this doctrine’s emergence is
part of a broader attack on the administrative state. 6 In light of the recent
elevations of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, two major supporters of the
major questions doctrine, 7 both the doctrine’s supporters and critics believe that
the Supreme Court will soon begin targeting major questions more vigorously. 8
Yet in this back and forth, something important has been overlooked:
Chevron’s application to minor questions also merits attention. Minor
questions—i.e., relatively uncontroversial, often bipartisan policies that help
%F
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decided an issue of “earnest and profound debate across the country”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000) (rejecting an FDA interpretation of the Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act that would grant FDA “jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant
portion of the American economy”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994)
(rejecting an FCC interpretation that would allow the agency to eliminate a “crucial provision of
the statute for 40% of a major sector of the industry”); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 248889 (2015) (refusing to defer to how an agency resolved a major question).
3 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2017) (criticizing the major questions doctrine as part of a larger attack on
Chevron); Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2192 (2016) (arguing that the
major questions doctrine “conflicts with [the Supreme Court’s] own understanding of Chevron
doctrine”). But see Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major
Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 359-60 (2016) (arguing that the doctrine is “worth
preserving,” despite objections).
4 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1959 (2017)
(rejecting the “presumption that Congress speaks clearly when it delegates big questions”); Kevin
O. Leske, Essay, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN.
L. 479, 480 (2016) (arguing the major questions doctrine is inconsistent with the separation of
powers premises underlying Chevron deference (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984))).
5 See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 2200 (suggesting that there may be no “difference between
‘major’ and ‘minor’ questions”); cf. Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800, 825 (5th Cir. 2020) (Willett, J.,
concurring) (explaining that “[r]easonable judicial minds can, and do, differ” about what is major or
minor, which risks “‘I know it when I see it’ application” (citing Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson,
Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 45 (2010))).
6 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 3, at 27-28, 88-89 (identifying a “growing judicial resistance to
administrative governance and judicial concern over the constitutional legitimacy of the
administrative state”); cf. Nicholas Bagley & Julian Davis Mortenson, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278-79 (2021) (discussing rise of “critics of the administrative state”).
7 See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, The Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO.
L.J. 1323, 1382 (2019) (explaining Gorsuch’s skepticism of the administrative state more broadly);
Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1433-37 (2018) [hereinafter Sohoni,
King’s Domain] (explaining Kavanaugh’s “robust” approach to major questions).
8 See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 934
(2019) (“Justice Kavanaugh’s appointment to the High Court is yet another reason for interrogating
the major questions doctrine.”); Marla D. Tortorice, Nondelegation and the Major Questions Doctrine:
Displacing Interpretive Power, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2019) (arguing that Gorsuch’s distrust of
administrative law manifests itself in his approach to the major questions doctrine).
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the public but that are not especially salient—are ubiquitous. They include
“good government” measures like making information more accessible,
updating obsolete rules, or closing loopholes. 9 The public is often better off
when the government addresses such minor questions. Yet contrary to the
conventional view that Chevron deference inherently results in a more active
federal government, 10 there is reason to fear that sometimes minor questions
are not addressed because of deference.
This counterintuitive claim is explained by collective-action dynamics.
When two branches of government share the same policymaking space, a
shared temptation to freeride may systemically push both toward inactivity.
Policymaking for even relatively uncontroversial issues can be costly. Even if
a policy is beneficial overall, moreover, the costs to bring it about are not
evenly distributed; the branch that acts will bear most of the costs but will
only receive a portion of the benefits, creating positive externalities for the
non-acting branch. Hence, where overlapping policymaking power exists, we
sometimes should expect both Congress and the White House 11 to prefer the
other to act. And because both Congress and the White House often have
that same incentive, it is possible that the equilibrium outcome is that no one
acts. 12 Professor Daniel Hemel has examined this collective-action dynamic
in the context of tax law. As he has explained, it appears that even when the
White House has the power to increase tax revenue via regulation pursuant
+F
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9 See, e.g., Susan Jensen, An Informal Legislative History of the Reauthorization of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1410, 1411 (2015) (explaining why the
nonpartisan Administrative Conference of the United States, which addresses lower-profile issues
of administration, enjoys “bipartisan support across the political spectrum”).
10 This view cuts across ideological lines. Compare, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d
1142, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 2016) (arguing that deference “add[s] prodigious new powers to an already
titanic administrative state”) (Gorsuch, J., concurring), with Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1635 n.96 (2019) (explaining that one “pragmatic advantage” of Chevron is that it
“allows agencies to act relatively freely” when “address[ing] new problems”).
11 The “White House” here is used as a stand-in for an entity exercising executive power. Whether
the President can lawfully direct how agencies use delegated authority is a disputed issue. The Supreme
Court, however, has suggested that the Constitution demands such presidential control of agency
policymaking or “the buck would stop somewhere else.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514
(2010)). In any event, the White House appears to have increasingly taken control over agency
policymaking in recent decades. See note 126, infra. No doubt, the White House does not actually direct
all policy. Although the fact that not all agency action is meaningfully directed by the President
undoubtedly complicates the analysis, it does not defeat it. See pp. 1227–29, infra.
12 See generally John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286, 286
(1951) (describing mixed strategies and coordination conflicts); Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s
Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 639-40, 707-08 (2017) (using mixed strategies to explain
patterns of taxation). To be sure, as explained below, overlapping authority sometimes results in
more action, especially for popular policies. See pp. 1205–06, infra. That too can be a collective-action
problem, but at least it does not prevent the emergence of beneficial policies. Overlapping authority
also, of course, sometimes enables action that would not otherwise occur. See p. 1211, infra.
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to policies that the President openly favors, sometimes nothing happens
precisely because Congress could also implement that policy. 13
This collective-action observation is relevant here because Chevron
deference, by design, gives the White House greater power to fashion
policy. 14 After all, at bottom, Chevron is a form of policymaking discretion
that is grounded in a theory of implied delegation from Congress to the
agency. 15 Because of deference, agencies have a freer hand to make policy.
The expanded policymaking discretion that Chevron provides agencies in turn
creates a larger overlapping policymaking space between Congress and the
White House (i.e., the universe of policies that either branch can create),
amplifying the risk of stagnation caused by collective-action dynamics.
Notably, the risk of stagnation may be particularly pronounced for at least
two categories of policies. First, stagnation is presumably more likely for
policies with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs. Most models of
government action already predict that policymakers are less likely to act if
the benefits are shared broadly and the costs fall on a narrow group. 16 That
dynamic may be exacerbated, however, when policymaking power is shared
and freeriding becomes possible. Because minor questions often fit that
diffuse-benefits-concentrated-costs mold (which is a reason why they tend to
be less salient), the collective-action problem caused by deference may
disproportionately affect them. 17 Second, stagnation is also presumably more
#%F

#&F
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13 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 12, at 644 (explaining that “some revenue-raising measures that
could be implemented via regulation or via legislation may not be implemented at all” because both
the White House and Congress can act).
14 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(explaining that interpretative discretion gives “the Chief Executive” authority “to make [more]
policy choices” based on “the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy”).
15 See, e.g., id. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Essay, The Constitutional Case for
Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 960 (2018) (“‘[J]udicial deference to agency “interpretation”
of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency.’ That is, an
ambiguous agency statute is simply another way of doing something that Congress does all the
time—namely, authorize an agency to make a policy choice.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1983))).
16 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Essay, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 509 (1995) (“One of the fundamental
problems of democratic politics is that concentrated interest groups have more influence . . . than
diffuse groups, even if the diffuse groups represent a numerical majority.”); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275, 287 (1988) (explaining that we should expect “concentrated benefits and, especially,
concentrated costs to stimulate more interest group formation” and that “distributed costs or benefits
will presumably not tend to produce as much organizational activity”) (applying MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 (1st ed. 1965)); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation,
in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 366-72 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
17 This is especially true because minor questions do not break down along partisan lines, which
means that one path out of the collective-action problem—government gridlock—is less available.
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likely for technical issues that require relatively more resources to address. 18
When policymaking authority is shared and the costs of making policy are
high, freeriding should become relatively more attractive. This characteristic
also disproportionately applies to minor questions because technical issues
are often inherently less salient. Minor questions thus should be unusually
susceptible to a collective-action problem. Yet because minor questions are,
well, minor, no one to date has recognized the danger.
Compounding that danger, moreover, is the fact that collective-action
dynamics may disproportionately have long-term effects for minor questions.
By definition, major questions prompt widespread debate and political action,
which may moot the need for judicial review. For instance, the Court had no
need to consider whether to apply the major questions doctrine to the FCC’s
“net neutrality” regulations—which then-Judge Kavanaugh urged should be
treated as a major question 19—because intervening events mooted the issue,
namely, the election of a different president. 20 The same is true for the Obama
Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which the Supreme Court stayed on major
questions grounds, 21 but which also was later mooted by a new presidential
administration. 22 Even ordinary policies—those that are neither major nor
minor, such as (perhaps 23) the policy in Chevron itself about whether the term
“stationary source” allows the “bubble concept” 24—often are addressed by
#*F

#+F

$!F

$#F
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$&F

See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 12, at 644 (explaining why political gridlock can defeat collective-action
problems); see also pp. 1215, 1225, supra (explaining this point).
18 Cf., e.g., Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1712-13 (2008) (noting that it is difficult to regulate
“where the new information is technical or scientific, the payoff to the public from acting on it is
relatively modest and diffuse, and [a group] . . . will benefit . . . from regulatory delay”).
19 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The FCC’s net neutrality rule is a major rule for purposes of
the Supreme Court’s major rules doctrine.”).
20 See Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 2019), aff ’g Restoring Internet
Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018), rev’g Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd.
5601 (2015).
21 See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (granting stay); Application for Stay, West
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773) (requesting stay because EPA “must point to
‘clear[]’ congressional authorization whenever it ‘claims to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy’” (quoting Util. Air
Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014))).
22 See Order Granting Motion, State of West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 17, 2019) (en banc) (dismissing litigation as moot).
23 As will be apparent in this Article, drawing lines between major, ordinary, and minor
questions can be difficult—as the major questions literature already recognizes. That said, the
Supreme Court does distinguish between ordinary and major questions, and distinguishing between
ordinary and minor ones—although undoubtedly difficult in application—is conceptually useful.
24 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40 (1984)
(explaining the basis of the litigation, viz., whether the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air
Act includes individual devices or “all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’”).
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someone because they are deemed important enough. Yet for minor questions like
whether to close small tax loopholes that Congress may never have intended to
begin with, eliminate outdated tariffs that no longer achieve their policy
objectives, or make technical changes to environmental law, each of which is
discussed below, stagnation may be much more long-lasting.
The conventional wisdom that Chevron necessarily enables greater
government activity is thus incomplete. Sometimes deference leads to more
action, but sometimes it might prevent action that would otherwise occur. The
time, therefore, may have come for what this Article calls the minor questions
doctrine. There are at least three options for such a doctrine. One involves
expanding Chevron Step Zero 25 in a way similar to the major questions doctrine.
Another involves recognizing a new species of Chevron waiver 26 that would allow
agencies to prospectively renounce deference to certain possible interpretations.
And the third involves flipping the Chevron presumption so that agencies only
receive deference when Congress says so. The common denominator is that each
option would eliminate overlapping policymaking space for minor questions.
Although there are important counterarguments to a minor questions doctrine,
reform may be necessary to counter the risk that deference sometimes thwarts
rather than enables policymaking.
$'F

$(F

I. UNDERSTANDING CHEVRON AND MAJOR QUESTIONS
To appreciate the need for a minor questions doctrine, it is helpful to
understand Chevron deference and the emergence of the major questions
doctrine, which is an exception to the ordinary Chevron framework.
A. The Basics of Chevron
The story of Chevron has been told many times before. 27 The gist is that
the Supreme Court has held that Congress implicitly delegates to federal
agencies interpretative discretion over the statutes they administer, within
$)F

25 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (defining “Step
Zero” as “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all”).
26 Chevron waiver refers to the notion that a court will not defer to agency’s interpretation if
the agency’s counsel did not request it in court. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Rozansky, Comment, Waiving
Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927, 1927 (2018) (defining Chevron waiver as “the idea that an agency’s
decision not to seek deference can prevent the application of the Chevron framework”). The Supreme
Court arguably has recognized Chevron waiver, see Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct.
1462, 1474 (2020), but the D.C. Circuit has rejected it, see, for example, Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789
(2020). The species of Chevron waiver proposed here is different. Here, an agency could
prospectively forswear judicial deference for certain policies.
27 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
757, 772 (2017) (acknowledging Chevron as “the most frequently cited case in administrative law”).
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certain bounds, unless Congress directly speaks to an issue. 28 The Court
famously articulated the two-step rule as follows:
$*F

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 29
$+F

A reviewing court’s conclusion about which reading of a statute is the “best” one
therefore need not be dispositive; if the statute is sufficiently ambiguous, the
court will uphold the agency’s reading so long as it is reasonable. 30 For instance,
in Chevron itself, the Supreme Court upheld the Environmental Protection
Agency’s preferred plant-wide definition of “stationary source,” even though the
D.C. Circuit had reasoned that the best reading would treat each individual
smokestack as a “stationary source.” 31 The Justices did not disagree with the D.C.
Circuit’s view on its own terms but held that the court asked the wrong question.
Chevron thus departs from ordinary interpretation by giving the Executive
Branch greater policymaking authority when statutes are ambiguous. 32 Put
differently, Chevron acts as an implicit delegation of discretionary power to make
policy through interpretation.
Chevron’s seemingly straightforward rule has proven to be complicated.
For instance, although the Supreme Court usually says that Chevron has two
steps (is the statute ambiguous, and if so, is the agency’s interpretation
reasonable? 33), the Court also sometimes suggests it really only has a single
%!F

%#F

%$F

%%F

28 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 511-12; see also Peter L. Strauss, Essay, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space”
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (characterizing Chevron deference as
“space” within which an administrative agency has been “delegated or allocated authority”).
29 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
30 Id. at 844.
31 Id. at 840-42, 866.
32 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 25, at 190 (“Chevron might well be seen . . . as the
administrative state’s very own McCulloch v. Maryland, permitting agencies to do as they wish so
long as there is a reasonable connection between their choices and congressional instructions.”);
Philip Hamburger, Response, Chevron On Stilts: A Response To Jonathan Siegel, 72 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 77, 78 (2018) (“Chevron requires judges to abandon their duty of independent judgment.”).
33 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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step (is the agency’s interpretation reasonable? 34). Yet other times, the Court
acts like there are more than two steps, for instance by asking whether the
type of agency decision is one that Congress implicitly wants to trigger
deference (“Step Zero” 35), the agency followed the proper procedures (“Step
0.5” 36), the agency acknowledged the ambiguity (“Step One-and-a-Half ” 37),
or the agency’s reading was reasonable yet also for some reason arbitrary and
capricious (which may be “Step Three” or “Step Four,” depending on your
count 38). Even beyond confusion about Chevron’s steps, it also turns out that
the very concept of ambiguity is ambiguous. 39 And whether an agency’s
reading is “reasonable” can also be the subject of reasonable debate. 40
Chevron deference is also controversial—and has been for a long time. 41
No statute explicitly authorizes deference 42 and the Administrative Procedure
%&F

%'F

%(F

%)F
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34 See Entergy Corp. v Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009) (invoking the reasonableness
inquiry at the “outset”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 VA L. REV. 597, 597 (2009) (arguing for a one-step version of Chevron).
35 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
836 (2001) (describing “step zero”); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)
(articulating the step).
36 See Michael Pollack & Daniel Hemel, Chevron Step 0.5, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE &
COMMENT (June 24, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-step-0-5-by-michael-pollack-anddaniel-hemel [https://perma.cc/9U4T-JPBT] (“[W]e suggest that Encino is indeed a different
move—a move we’ll call ‘Chevron step 0.5.’ If Chevron step zero asks whether Congress intended for
the agency to fill gaps in the relevant statute, Chevron step 0.5 asks whether the agency has followed
the proper procedure in filling the gap.” (discussing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct.
2117 (2016)).
37 See Hemel & Nielson, supra note 27, at 757 (explaining the doctrine); see also Negusie v.
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 521-23 (2009) (applying a version of the doctrine).
38 See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed
and Why it Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 832 (2010) (“[I]t has been argued
that the reviewing court should also apply the arbitrary, capricious standard to
the . . . interpretation, adding a third or fourth step, depending on when or how you are counting.”).
39 See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2136 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“Unfortunately, there is often no
good or predictable way for judges to determine whether statutory text contains ‘enough’ ambiguity . . . .
That’s because there is no right answer.”).
40 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441 (2018) (explaining different courts’ approaches to Chevron Step Two reasonableness analysis).
41 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (“Chevron is a siren’s song, seductive but treacherous.”).
42 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative
and Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1313-15 (2015) (explaining that the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706) seems to grant “reviewing courts [the ability to]
decide matters of law de novo, without any deference to the administrators’ views”).
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Act’s text, 43 especially combined with the history of judicial review, 44 may
cut against it. Going further, Justice Thomas has suggested that Chevron may
be unconstitutional, 45 a view seemingly also embraced by Justice Gorsuch. 46
Chevron’s defenders, however, question whether such criticisms can be
reconciled with the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to delegation 47 and
argue, pragmatically, that Chevron enables more efficient administration of
national standards. 48 Defenders of deference also invoke political
accountability—a point made in Chevron itself. 49 Finally, when a statute is
ambiguous, the argument goes, someone must make policy, and it makes more
sense for that “someone” to be an expert agency. 50
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43 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that Chevron conflicts with the APA’s command that the “reviewing court
[should] . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706)); cf. Gillian E. Metzger,
Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1300-01 (2012)
(“The Court made no mention of the APA in Chevron itself, and so far the statute has only played
a minor role in subsequent decisions.”). But see Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1656-57 (defending Chevron
as a plausible interpretation of the APA); 1 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.32 (Wolters Kluwer, 6th ed. 2019) (similar).
44 See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE
L.J. 908 (2017) (challenging whether Chevron is consistent with historical practice). But see Sunstein,
supra note 10, at 1648-50 (pushing back).
45 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Chevron . . . precludes judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them to abandon what they
believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of an agency’s construction. It thus
wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is,’ and hands it over
to the Executive.” (quoting Nat’l Cable & Tel. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983
(2005)); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). But see Siegel, supra note 15, at 941
(resisting this argument).
46 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1156 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that Chevron violates Article III of the Constitution); id. at 1149 (“[T]he
fact is Chevron and [its progeny] permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core
judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”).
47 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 3, at 41 (“Article III may in fact militate in favor of deference
to expert elucidation of statutory standards if the questions at issue require specialized expertise or
experience that the federal courts lack.”).
48 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1112 (1987) (arguing that
different interpretations among different courts could make it difficult to administer laws uniformly).
49 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).
50 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 3, at 94 (disputing the view that “[i]f Congress chooses to
delegate regulatory authority to agencies, part of the price of delegation may be that the court, not
the agency, must hold the power to say what the statute means” (quoting Farina, supra note 41, at
498)); cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) (“[T]he judgments
about the way the real world works that have gone into the [agency’s] policy are precisely the kind
that agencies are better equipped to make than are courts. This practical agency expertise is one of
the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.”).
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Implicit in many of these defenses of deference is the premise that
Chevron, like other species of delegation, is good because it allows the
Executive Branch to make policy, which frees up Congress to act on other
matters or allows the federal government to address issues when Congress is
deadlocked. 51 Yet the notion that Chevron allows the Executive Branch to
make policy is controversial in part precisely because many believe that too
much policy is made. 52 Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, has called Chevron
“a powerful weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal.” 53 Notably, in recent
years, an increasingly skeptical view of deference has been embraced by many
federal judges who oppose the enhanced interpretative discretion that
Chevron provides agencies. 54
Following the confirmations of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh,
many expect the Supreme Court to further limit Chevron’s domain. 55 In fact,
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51 Cf. John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 191, 192 (2007) (explaining
the theory that delegation “permit[s] [Congress] to accomplish more in the public interest”).
52 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (criticizing Chevron for enabling lawmaking “without the inconvenience of having to
engage the legislative processes the Constitution prescribes,” i.e., another “form of Lawmaking
Made Easy, one that permits all too easy intrusions on the liberty of the people” (citing Manning,
supra note 51, at 202)); Charles J. Cooper, The Flaws of Chevron Deference, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
307, 308 (2017) (“Today the administrative state is essentially a sovereign unto itself, a one-branch
government whose regulatory grasp extends into virtually every human activity.”); Hamburger, supra
note 32, at 82-83 (“Chevron is a . . . judicial effort to expand the administrative state.”); Richard A.
Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 491, 505 (2008) (“[D]eference . . . ignores the danger that good bureaucrats will be more
intent on expanding their power than behaving like disinterested experts . . . .”). Unsurprisingly, the
view that Chevron is the reason for a larger federal government is not universally held. See, e.g.,
Terence J. McCarrick, Jr., In Defense of a Little Judiciary: A Textual and Constitutional Foundation for
Chevron, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55, 85 (2018) (“So, what—if not Chevron—accounts for the
continued expansion of the administrative state? Conscious political choice.”).
53 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 314 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also
Heinzerling, supra note 4, at 1958 (noting “the Chief Justice’s evident desire to trim the power of
administrative agencies”).
54 See, e.g., Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten
Years on the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 324 (2017) (criticizing administrative agencies’
sense of entitlement and “sloppy work” that result from Chevron deference); Egan v. Del. River Port
Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he problems
[created by Chevron deference] are serious and ought to be fixed.”); Christopher J. Walker, Attacking
Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018)
(documenting examples of judges criticizing Chevron); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302 (2018) (using a survey to show that most of the participating federal circuit
judges “are not fans of Chevron, with the significant exception of the judges we interviewed from
the D.C. Circuit”).
55 E.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J.
931, 934-35 (2021); Metzger, supra note 3, at 17. Although she has said less about the subject than
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, some commentators speculate that Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s
confirmation may lead to revision of Chevron. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson,
Foreword: The Future of Chevron Deference, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 1116 (2021) (noting speculation).
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the Court has already begun to do so. In Epic System Corp. v. Lewis, Justice
Gorsuch, writing for the Court, held that Chevron does not apply when the
Department of Justice disagrees with an independent agency about how to read
a statute. 56 The Court has also arguably disparaged Chevron itself. 57 And in Kisor
v. Wilkie, a majority of the Court upheld a weakened form of Auer deference
(which applies when an agency interprets a regulation rather than a statute). 58
Although Chief Justice Roberts joined parts of the Kisor opinion, he declined to
similarly defend Chevron on stare decisis grounds. 59
'(F

')F
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B. The Major Questions Doctrine
Driven by nondelegation concerns 60 and its associated fear of government
“overreach,” 61 the Supreme Court over the last few decades has developed an
exception to Chevron known as the major questions doctrine. Under the
doctrine, a court—in “extraordinary cases”—will set aside the ordinary
Chevron framework altogether on the theory that absent an “express[]”
statement from Congress, judges should not assume that Congress would
have delegated “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’” to
an agency. 62 In this way, the major questions doctrine resembles the rule of
(!F
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56 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (“[D]eferring to the Executive on
grounds of political accountability . . . becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from both sides
of its mouth, articulating no single position on which it might be held accountable.”); cf. Hickman
& Nielson, Future of Chevron Deference, supra note 55, at 1115-16 (explaining that lawyers may be
reluctant to cite Chevron).
57 See, e.g., SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“But whether Chevron should remain
is a question we may leave for another day.”); see also Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case,
the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”).
58 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (upholding, but modifying, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997)).
59 See id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“Issues surrounding
judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations are distinct from those raised
in connection with judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress. I
do not regard the Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter question.” (citing Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984))).
60 See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“Although it is nominally a canon of statutory construction, we apply the major questions doctrine
in service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by
transferring that power to an executive agency.”); Loshin & Nielson, supra note 5, at 23 (“The Court
is alarmed by excessive delegation but is wary about directly enforcing the nondelegation doctrine—
so it looks for more judicially manageable proxies.”).
61 See, e.g., Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV.
777, 785 (2017) (explaining that the Court’s “hesitance to apply Chevron in its pure, unvarnished
form” is driven in part by fear of “executive overreach”).
62 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (citations omitted); see also Jonas J.
Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 445 (2016)
(analyzing the doctrine).
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interpretation that courts should address nondelegation concerns by reading
statutes narrowly. 63
That said, it has taken time to place where the major questions doctrine
fits in administrative law. In arguably the first case 64 in the line, MCI v.
AT&T, Justice Scalia framed the inquiry at Chevron’s first step, 65 on the
theory that an ambiguity for Chevron purposes cannot exist where the agency’s
interpretation would work “a fundamental revision of the statute” that
violates “the heart” of scheme. 66 The Court then continued to apply a step
one formulation in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 67 despite the presence of
ambiguity. 68 Reviewing MCI and Brown & Williamson, Scalia later suggested
the principle: “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” 69 That formulation has since been
used by justices across the ideological spectrum in a number of cases. 70
Recognizing that the Court’s approach to ambiguity in these cases, with its
emphasis on the significance of the policy question, differed from how
ambiguity is treated in other cases, Cass Sunstein argued that the major
questions doctrine is best understood as falling within step zero. 71 And in
King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts appears to have agreed, concluding that
certain questions—such as whether subsidies are available on federal health(%F
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63 See, e.g., Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (“We still regularly rein in Congress’s efforts to delegate
legislative power; we just call what we’re doing by different names.”) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (“In recent years, our application of the
nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and,
more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be
thought to be unconstitutional.”).
64 Then-Judge Breyer noted the idea earlier. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (suggesting that Congress is “more likely to have
focused upon, and answered, major questions”).
65 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994) (“Since an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not entitled to
deference when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear, the Commission’s permissive
detariffing policy can be justified only if it makes a less than radical or fundamental change in the
Act’s tariff-filing requirement.” (internal citation omitted)).
66 Id. at 231.
67 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000).
68 See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 226 (arguing that the statute was ambiguous in Brown & Williamson); cf. Glob. Tel*Link
v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J., concurring) (faulting Justice Scalia for
“never conced[ing] that the word ‘modify’ was ambiguous [in MCI], which it was”).
69 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citing MCI, 512 U.S. at 231;
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60).
70 See Loshin & Nielson, supra note 5, at 47 (explaining that the entire Court has embraced the
doctrine); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (defending the doctrine in a decision
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan).
71 Sunstein, supra note 25, at 236.
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care exchanges—are too significant for the Chevron framework. 72 King is
noteworthy because the Court upheld the agency’s interpretation about the
availability of tax credits on federal rather than state exchanges, but it did so
without deference. Other cases in the major-questions line both deny
deference and further reject the lawfulness of the agency’s interpretation.
The major questions doctrine is also controversial. Its critics contend that
there is no principled way to determine whether a question is “major” or not.
After all, can a court reliably tell whether a policy “is truly an elephant—and not
just a rather plump mouse,” or whether the ambiguity “is sufficiently
unimportant to be a mousehole—and not just a rather cramped circus tent”? 73
Moreover, if Chevron is premised on the notion that a politically-accountable
agency is better positioned than a politically-isolated court to resolve
ambiguities in statutes, then why should that analysis change depending on the
importance of the issue? 74 Indeed, might principles of political accountability
cut in favor of agency resolution of major issues, as presidents run for office on
just such questions? 75 And for those who believe for “pragmatic” 76 reasons that
robust administrative power is essential for the “effective” functioning of
modern government, 77 the whole idea of the major questions doctrine can be
maddening. Some scholars have thus urged the Supreme Court to inter the
doctrine outright, 78 or at least read it very narrowly. 79
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not backed away from it. Indeed,
then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, while on the D.C. Circuit, urged greater use of
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72 See 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (holding that “the two-step framework announced in Chevron” does
not apply “[i]n extraordinary cases” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73 Loshin & Nielson, supra note 5, at 45.
74 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 4, at 1959 (rejecting doctrine on this ground).
75 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2606 (2006) (“[E]xpertise and accountability, the linchpins of Chevron’s legal fiction,
are highly relevant to the resolution of major questions. Contrary to Justice Breyer’s suggestion,
there is no reason to think that Congress would want courts, rather than agencies, to resolve major
questions.”). This argument, of course, assumes that the major questions doctrine is designed to
accurately reflect what Congress intends. To the extent the Supreme Court believes that too much
delegated power is unconstitutional and that the constitutional test turns at least in part on whether
a policy is major, then constitutional avoidance might have more teeth for major policies. This
Article does not address constitutional avoidance.
76 See, e.g., Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations
First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
447, 455 (2013) (noting the “pragmatic” argument).
77 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 3, at 92-94.
78 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 4, at 1958 (calling this method of interpretation
“nonsensical”); Note, supra note 3, at 2212 (“The Court should follow its own guidance and remove
the major question excrescence from administrative law.”),
79 See, e.g., Sohoni, King’s Domain, supra note 7, at 1439 (arguing that King should be read as
only holding that “[a]gency action that triggers large-scale government spending on the basis of
ambiguous statutory authority falls outside Chevron’s domain”); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 530-32 (2007) (reading Brown & Williamson narrowly).
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the major questions doctrine—which he called the “major rules” doctrine. 80
According to Kavanaugh, the FCC’s decision to impose so-called “net
neutrality” regulations should be evaluated and found wanting as a major
question. 81 This statement hewed closely to recent Supreme Court decisions
like Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. 82 Perhaps even more importantly, the
Court itself stayed the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which
would have significantly affected the nation’s energy sector, on what appear
to be major-questions grounds. 83
In fact, not only has the Court shown no inclination to back away from
the major questions doctrine, it has suggested a willingness to expand it.
Recall that the major questions doctrine has been understood as an exception
to Chevron, a statute-based presumption that Congress intends agencies to
reasonably resolve ambiguities. Yet the Court may be willing to
constitutionalize the doctrine, meaning that Congress could not even expressly
empower courts to defer to agency resolutions of major questions when the
relevant statutory authorization is ambiguous. Now-Justice Kavanaugh
recently commended Justice Gorsuch’s “thoughtful” call to revisit the
intelligible principle standard. 84 Kavanaugh then tipped his hand about what
the new standard ought to be. Notably, that standard openly borrows from
the major questions doctrine. 85
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80 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
81 See id. at 422-24.
82 See id. at 420-21 (citing 573 U.S. 302 (2014)) (“It would have been a major step for EPA to
regulate the greenhouse gas emissions of so many large and small facilities. But there was no clear
statutory authorization for the EPA to do so.”).
83 See, e.g., Application for Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773 (Jan. 26, 2016) (successfully
requesting stay on major-questions grounds); Jim Dennison, Note, A Cost-Benefit Analysis-Based
Interpretation of Reciprocity Under Clean Air Act Section 115(C), 103 VA. L. REV. 1561, 1587 (2017)
(explaining that the litigation “is likely to help clarify the major questions and elephants in
mouseholes doctrines”).
84 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari) (seemingly endorsing Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Gundy v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 2116 (2019)). Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas while Justice Alito wrote that “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider
the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at
2131 (Alito, J., concurring).
85 As Justice Kavanaugh wrote in Paul:

[T]he Court has not adopted a nondelegation principle for major questions. But the
Court has applied a closely related statutory interpretation doctrine: In order for an
executive or independent agency to exercise regulatory authority over a major policy
question of great economic and political importance, Congress must either: (i)
expressly and specifically decide the major policy question itself and delegate to the
agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate
to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy question and to regulate
and enforce. . . . Justice Gorsuch would not allow that second category—congressional
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II. UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE-ACTION DYNAMICS
To understand the possible value of a minor questions doctrine, it is also
necessary to understand an important principle of decisionmaking: sometimes
less is more. In a group setting, what is rational for each individual may result
in suboptimal outcomes for the group. This Part thus first explains how
collective-action problems work generally and under what circumstances they
are most likely to arise. It then offers solutions recognized in the literature.
A. The Logic of Collective-Action Dynamics
The law is no stranger to collective-action dynamics. 86 The basic idea is
that sharing authority can lead to suboptimal outcomes. 87 When groups are
involved, what is rational for each individual member may nonetheless result
in outcomes that are irrational for everyone. 88
A classic example of a collective-action problem, and one that will form
the basis for much of this Article, is the Snowdrift Game, also sometimes
called the Chicken Game. 89 Imagine one car going north and another going
south, when they both come across the same snowdrift that has blocked the
road. The only way for either car to get through is if someone shovels the
snow; there is no way to clear the road, however, that only benefits one of the
*(F
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delegations to agencies of authority to decide major policy questions—even if Congress
expressly and specifically delegates that authority.
Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (emphasis added).
86 See, e.g., In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 412 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“A good
board . . . does not suffer from the collective action problem of disaggregated stockholders.”
(quoting In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005)); In re Inslaw,
Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The object of the automatic stay provision is essentially
to solve a collective action problem—to make sure that creditors do not destroy the bankrupt estate
in their scramble for relief.”).
87 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Response, Cybersecurity: Toward A Meaningful Policy Framework, 90
TEX. L. REV. 87, 95 (2012) (defining “a classic collective-action problem” as a situation “where
everyone doing his or her personal best . . . is not going to produce an optimal result”); Robert D.
Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (“When activities spilled over from one state to another, the Framers
recognized that the actions of individually rational states produced irrational results for the nation
as a whole—the definition of a collective action problem.”). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of
Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 226 (2014) (“[T]here is no
standard definition of . . . ‘collective action problem’ in the legal literature. I will argue below that
the term is often employed with some liberality, and even a touch of promiscuity.”).
88 See, e.g., MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 19 (1987) (“[A]
collective action problem exists where rational individual action can lead to a strictly Pareto-inferior
outcome, that is, an outcome which is strictly less preferred by every individual than at least one
other outcome.”).
89 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 2189, 2217 (2012) (citing ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION AND WELFARE 58-62, 128-32 (1986)).
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drivers. The worst-case scenario for both drivers is if no one digs, in which
case no one moves forward. Thus, one might expect both drivers to pick up a
shovel. Yet for each individual, it is best if the other driver does the work.
While the worker is out in the cold, the non-worker can enjoy a warm vehicle.
When this situation arises, both drivers may opt to stay in the car. 90 In the
conceptually similar Chicken Game, two drivers are driving at each other. If
a driver swerves out of the way, he loses face and puts himself at some risk of
skidding into the ditch—a minor accident. Each driver thus wants the other
to play “chicken” and swerve (i.e., act), but if neither driver swerves, a serious
accident will result. 91 Yet because each individual driver is better off if the
other one changes direction, it is possible that neither driver will swerve,
resulting in an accident. Thankfully, the worst-case outcome (either two cars
stalled in front of a snowdrift or, even worse, in a fiery collision) does not
always happen and when the costs of mutual inaction become dire enough, it
is quite unlikely to ever happen. 92 But it can happen, 93 and how likely it is to
happen depends on the players’ respective strategies.
Freeriding—letting someone else work while you benefit—is a common
element of collective-action dynamics. “A rational individual reasons that if
others engage in the behavior necessary to achieve the collective good, she
can free ride on their efforts and still gain the benefits of their behavior.” 94
This free-rider problem is closely associated with public goods, “that is, nonrival, non-excludable goods,” because “free-riders cannot be excluded from
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90 See Nicolas Suzor, Free-Riding, Cooperation, and “Peaceful Revolutions” in Copyright, 28 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 137, 173 (2014) (“[W]hen you are faced with a snowdrift blocking a road, it is better to
shovel it out of the way than to do nothing, better still if everyone shovels, best if someone else
shovels while you do nothing, and worst for everyone if nobody picks up a shovel.” (citing D.F.
Zheng, H.P. Yin, C.H. Chan & P.M. Hui, Cooperative Behavior in a Model of Evolutionary Snowdrift
Games with N-Person Interactions, 80 EUROPHYSICS LETTERS 18002, 18002-p1 (2007))).
91 See id. at 173 n.215 (citing Irwin Lipnowski & Shlomo Maital, Voluntary Provision of a Pure
Public Good as the Game of “Chicken,” 20 J. PUB. ECON. 381, 384 (1983)); see also Yoo, supra note 89,
at 2217-18 (discussing the “Chicken Game”). If fiery collisions are too outlandish for your taste, a
more mundane example about newlyweds may be better. Love is real, but dirty dishes somehow still
go unwashed in the sink.
92 See EDWARD C. ROSENTHAL, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO GAME THEORY 74
(2011) (“Not surprisingly, as the mutually destructive outcome becomes more severe, the players will
play less aggressively.”).
93 In fact, Thomas Schelling used almost this exact analogy in his classic treatment of nuclear
deterrence: the ultimate game of chicken. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE
116-18 (1966).
94 Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (2001) (citing ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 5-7 (1990)); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1465 (2011) (“Information acquisition may often suffer from a collective
action problem, in which each agent is tempted to free ride, shirking her own obligations to invest
in costly research . . . .”).
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obtaining the benefits these goods provide.” 95 If everyone benefits from a
good, each person may decide to let someone else produce the good.
Confronted with that incentive, however, it is possible that no one will bear
the cost: “If an entrepreneur stages a fireworks show, for example, people can
watch the show from their windows or backyards. Because the entrepreneur
cannot charge a fee for consumption, the fireworks show may go unproduced,
even if demand for the show is strong.” 96 To be sure, social norms may lead
to cooperation. 97 And it is also possible that a show will be so valuable that
someone will pay for it. 98 But sometimes no one does anything. And even when
someone does act, at the margins, a collective-action dynamic may reduce the
amount of activity in suboptimal ways. On the 4th of July, lots of people still
shoot fireworks even with a collective-action dynamic. But shows might be
better without a collective-action dynamic.
When two individuals can act and both face an incentive to freeride, game
theorists have recognized that the rational move for each player may be to
adopt a “mixed strategy” of sometimes acting and sometimes not. 99 The ratio
of action to inaction for each player depends on how much each values action,
combined with an assessment of how much the other side values action. 100
How this works can be described mathematically, 101 but the intuition is that
“always acting” or “never acting” does not always make sense given what the
other individual may do in response. 102
Finally, collective-action problems are both a common justification for
government intervention and a common explanation for government
inaction. For instance, when it comes to public goods like building streetlights
(a local problem) or providing an army (a national problem), 103 the
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95 Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
631, 634 (1993).
96 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, LIBR. OF ECONS. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/PublicGoods.html [https://perma.cc/ND7K-UE7G]; see also id. (“If the free-rider problem
cannot be solved, valuable goods and services—ones people otherwise would be willing to pay for—
will remain unproduced.”).
97 See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 137, 140 (2000) (explaining how social norms can increase cooperation).
98 See, e.g., ROSENTHAL, supra note 92, at 74 (noting that as the costs of inaction increase,
action becomes more likely).
99 See generally Nash, supra note 12 (explaining mixed strategies).
100 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 12, at 707-08 (explaining how presidential and congressional
actions are a function of the relative share of political benefits and costs borne by each branch).
101 See infra note 155.
102 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 37-39 (1994) (explaining mixed strategies and why rational actors may adopt them).
103 See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9,
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 602 n.132 (1998) (“A collective-action
problem exists whenever private markets are relied on to provide public goods, such as street lamps
and national defense.”).
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government may be best positioned to act because individuals may otherwise
be tempted to freeride. 104 At the same time, however, collective-action
dynamics may also distort the law and lead to inaction. Where the benefits of
a policy are diffuse, for example, but the policy’s costs are concentrated, it is
possible that no one will act to bring the policy about, or that a weaker version
of the policy will emerge, because the policy’s would-be beneficiaries will
hope that someone else does the necessary work while a highly motivated
interest group will oppose the policy. 105
#!&F
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B. Collective-Action Dynamics and Theories of Government
Implicit in the foregoing is the point that how often collective-action
problems prevent beneficial behavior depends on how decisions are made and
in particular the values decisionmakers place on action and inaction. Those
values, in turn, are affected by what motivates decisionmakers. To the extent
that decisionmakers are motivated by altruism, it is relatively less likely that
collective-action dynamics will prevent beneficial action. 106 In the fireworks
example, for instance, if a decisionmaker enjoys benefitting others (or just enjoys
lighting things on fire), then the fact there is no way to prevent others from
sharing in the experience is much less likely to prevent the show. The collectiveaction dynamic arises because individuals like watching fireworks and would
rather watch someone else’s than pay for their own. Or in the Chicken Game, if
one driver takes pleasure in keeping the other driver safe, he or she may very
well get out of the way without really playing the game. By contrast, if a
#!(F

104 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1st ed. 1965) (“It
would obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were possible, to deny the protection provided by the
military services, the police, and the courts to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of the
costs of government, and taxation is accordingly necessary.”). That said, even for public goods,
government action is not always necessary. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L.
& ECON. 357, 363-67 (1974) (describing the historical role of private individuals in building
lighthouses, a public good).
105 This point should not be taken too far; cooperation is not impossible, even for large, diffuse
groups. See generally GUNNAR TRUMBULL, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: THE POLITICAL POWER OF
WEAK INTERESTS (2012) (describing diffuse consumer groups that have successfully lobbied for
legislation). That said, at the margins, presumably it is easier to coordinate in small groups with
intense interests than large groups with diffuse interests. See Jonathan Rauch, Was Mancur Olson
Wrong?, AM. ENTER. INST. (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.aei.org/articles/was-mancur-olson-wrong
[https://perma.cc/P2SN-VPZN] (“Olson did not say diffuse interests cannot organize, any more
than Newton’s gravitational theory says you can’t walk uphill. He said it is harder, other things being
equal, for diffuse interests to organize.”).
106 See Lu Gram, Nayreen Daruwalla & David Osrin, Understanding Participation Dilemmas in
Community Mobilisation: Can Collective Action Theory Help?, 73 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMTY.
HEALTH 90, 91 (2019) (“In other situations, the direct benefits are excludable, but sharing still occurs
out of altruism.”).
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decisionmaker is less altruistic, then an inability to avoid freeriding may prevent
a firework show from happening or result in a fiery crash.
This point can be applied to theories of government behavior. What
motivates government officials is a difficult question, especially because the
answer no doubt varies. Some officials may have pecuniary or other less-thannoble interests in mind, 107 while others may be more altruistic. Steven Croley
has collected and summarized the leading theories. 108 Especially relevant is
the debate between those who subscribe to public-interest versus publicchoice models of government behavior—models this Article caricatures to
more cleanly present the distinction. The premise of the public-interest
model is that officials always try to do what is best for the public. 109 A very
simplified version of public choice, 110 by contrast, posits that those in power
look out for themselves, and are unlikely to do what benefits the public absent
some element of personal advantage. 111 Public choice theory, of course, has
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107 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2042 & n.247 (2014) (book reviews) (collecting
citations about the “revolving-door”); cf. DAVE BARRY, DAVE BARRY HITS BELOW THE BELTWAY
94 (2001) (“When they say ‘serve the nation,’ what they of course mean is that they want to be
whisked around the nation in a motorcade, and fly on Air Force One, and be catered to by a large
fawning entourage . . . .”).
108 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998). For further discussion of theories of what motivates government
regulation of the economy, see Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974).
109 See Croley, supra note 108, at 65-66 (describing the public interest theory); Daniel Shaviro,
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation
in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990) (“[T]he public interest view emphasizes the importance
of ideology and the desire to make good policy, which are seen as motivating legislators to seek to
improve society (according to their perhaps controversial notions of what is good).”).
Unsurprisingly, what an abstract concept like “the public interest” means in application is debatable.
See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 336 (2014) (“Debate over
what constitutes the ‘public interest’ enjoys a rich history both in political theory and in political
action.”); Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV. 506, 521
(2012) (characterizing the question as “imponderable”).
110 This is a simplified version—no doubt too simplified. As others have noted, the “homoeconomicus” view of human nature does not realistically portray how humans behave. See, e.g., D.
Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1040 (2011)
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009)). A more accurate portrayal of public choice would posit that the
public good is only one of many things that regulators care about. Surely everyone who goes to work
for government does so because they desire to see the public good promoted. Personal interests,
however, play a greater role in the overall balance of interests in public choice. See id. (explaining
the need for, and difficulties of, a broader conception of “self-interest”). For purposes of this Article’s
analysis, however, there is value in a caricature—it more sharply illustrates the point.
111 See Croley, supra note 108, at 34-35 (describing the basics of public choice theory); JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27 (1965) (“Self-interest, broadly conceived, is recognized to
be a strong motivating force in all human activity; and human action, if not bounded by ethical or
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its share of critics, especially when taken to extremes. 112 Even so, that doesn’t
mean the theory isn’t valuable 113 or that there are not examples of what looks
like public choice in action. 114
To the extent that government decisionmakers (e.g., members of
Congress or Executive Branch regulators) are motivated by the public
interest, we should expect less inaction when beneficial policies for the public
are on the table; by contrast, to the extent decisionmakers are motivated by
public choice, we should expect more inaction.
In reality, of course, the truth is presumably somewhere in the middle,
especially when (i) the entire universe of decisionmakers is considered and
(ii) the time-horizon is extended beyond a particular decision. The pool of
decisionmakers presumably includes individuals at different points on a
(simplified) public-interest-versus-public-choice spectrum and even publicinterest-minded individuals may make decisions that themselves are not in
the public interest on the theory that ensuring reelection will enable more
decisions in the public interest. 115 Likewise, even those who want to do good
may fail in their attempt because they lack interest in a particular issue that
would be beneficial if acted on; unfortunately, because we have finite
##$F

##%F
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moral restraints, is assumed more naturally to be directed toward the furtherance of individual or
private interest.”); cf. Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote to Rent-Seeking?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 165,
172 (2018) (“A counter-intuitive result of legislative and regulatory processes is that those who bear
the costs of regulation often lobby for its implementation . . . because they know that new entrants
into the market will not be able to afford the additional costs.”); Jeremy Kidd, Quacks or Bootleggers:
Who’s Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367, 441-42 (2018) (making the same
observation in the context of Dodd-Frank’s hedge fund regulations).
112 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory
in Legal Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1147-48 (arguing that public choice theory is overly
pessimistic).
113 Tom Ginsburg made the following observation about the theory:
Even if people are not self-interested, we may want to . . . assume that they are for
purposes of institutional design. As long as some large proportion of human behavior
involves self-interest—and even social constructivists would likely acknowledge that
this is the case—it makes sense to take self-interest into account as we design
institutions. Public choice-like insights have been utilized in this pragmatic manner
for two hundred years.
Id. at 1154.; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 4 (1991) (“[E]ven if [the most extreme positions] do not fully capture
the realities of government, they may still represent some important tendencies.”).
114 See, e.g., Gordon Tullock & Jimmye Hillman, Public Choice and Agriculture: An American
Example, in 3 ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 98, 104-09 (Partha Dasgupta ed., 1991)
(offering examples of potential public-choice decisions).
115 See, e.g., Frank H. Hill, Democracy and Progress, 6 UNIVERSAL REV. 1, 10 (Harry Quilter ed.,
1890) (“To get elected is the first duty of a politician; to get re-elected is his second duty. What
good can he do if he loses his seat?”). More generally, “there are many instances when the pursuit
of narrow self-interest by groups may arguably benefit the more diffuse public.” Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1303 n.67 (2003).
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resources (including time), no one can address everything. We all have
priorities. Accordingly, unless one believes that all policymakers only pursue
what an objective observer would call the public interest, whatever one’s
opinion of what generally motivates decisionmakers, we should worry about
collective-action dynamics.
C. How to Address Collective-Action Dynamics
Finally, and of particular importance here, it is possible to mitigate
collective-action problems. An answer to the Chicken Game, for instance, is
a credible commitment mechanism. 116 If the drivers know that one cannot
turn (for example, because she has openly removed the steering wheel), the
payoff structure changes. 117 Then, the rational response is for the driver who
can still steer to change direction. 118 Similarly, it may make sense for the
government to intervene to prevent a collective-action problem—for
instance, by itself providing a public good such as national defense. 119 In other
words, if the collective-action problem arises because two can act, a solution
to the problem is to take away that power from one of them. Other possible
solutions include increasing cooperation—by encouraging beneficial norms to
that effect 120 or by increasing punishment for lack of cooperation (itself a
form of “encouragement” 121). “Repeat-player” dynamics may also play a role
(e.g., by encouraging cooperation for fear of punishment in the next iteration
of the game), especially where the same parties are involved and know they
are in an iterative game. 122
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116 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22-28 (1960) (explaining
commitment mechanisms in game theory).
117 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1449-50 (2009)
(“These limits can often be conceptualized as legally imposed precommitment devices, similar to
one party (A) tearing out her own steering wheel during a game of roadway Chicken with another
party (B). If B indeed faces a Chicken Game payoff structure, he will see A’s precommitment and
swerve . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
118 See LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS 64 (2000) (explaining commitment
mechanisms, including openly tossing aside a steering wheel).
119 See Cowen, supra note 96 (discussing national defense as a public good).
120 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 918 (1996)
(“Good social norms solve collective action problems by encouraging people to do useful things that
they would not do without the relevant norms.”).
121 See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP.
L. 453, 461 (2006) (“One solution, most associated with organized crime, is to kill the snitch.”).
122 Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1132 n.86 (2005)
(noting how “features” of “the legislative process, such as logrolling, a norm of collegiality, [and] the
presence of repeat players” may act to “mitigate[] collective action problems”). That said, repeatplayer dynamics are not a cure-all. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 573, 598 (2015) (“[A]n industry structure conducive to collective action, combined with the
strategic use of positional and informational advantages that intermediaries derive as repeat players
in a particular market, may operate to entrench an inefficient institutional arrangement.”); David
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III. CHEVRON AND COLLECTIVE-ACTION DYNAMICS
The conventional wisdom—shared by both those who are wary of “an
already titanic administrative state” 123 and those who believe agencies need
authority to address “modern problems” 124—is that delegation, of which
Chevron deference is a species, by its very nature results in more federal
activity. 125 After all, the theory goes, absent Chevron, where an ambiguous
statute is best read as foreclosing some policy, only Congress can create that
policy. Because of Chevron, however, an agency can also sometimes create the
policy in that situation. 126 So, on the theory that two is more than one, we
should expect that more policy will be created (or at least more activity will
occur, including deregulation). Both sides of the ideological debate about
Chevron share the premise. They just disagree about whether increased
activity should be applauded.
Yet that shared premise may be false, or at least incomplete. To be sure, the
premise may be true for major questions; indeed, one reason the White House
uses regulatory power for high-profile policy issues is because Congress refuses
to enact new legislation. 127 This means that if the Supreme Court continues to
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Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 482 (1999)
(explaining why it can “more difficult to control opportunism than the ‘repeat player’ story might
lead one to believe,” including the lack of good information about what has happened and why).
123 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
124 Cf. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
292-93 (2013) (explaining that “open-ended, broad delegations of regulatory authority” enable “the
administrative state [to] be responsive to modern problems”).
125 See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity and
Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1911 (2017) (“[T]he Chevron doctrine
encourages agency aggressiveness on a large scale. Under the guise of ambiguity, agencies can stretch
the meaning of statutes enacted by Congress to accommodate their preferred policy outcomes.”).
126 The President, the White House, and federal agencies do not always overlap in terms of
agenda. See Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686 (2016)
(“[A]dministrative law has failed to take the complexity and variety of presidential control into
account.”); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755,
1761 (2013) (“Presidents delegate regulatory review to a number of agents . . . who themselves
disagree and conflict over what the President desires.”). Nevertheless, it is no secret that the
Presidency, acting through White House personnel, has increasingly assumed greater control of the
agencies and their regulatory actions. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272-81 (2001) (describing this trend). Some argue that Article II of the
Constitution requires such control—a question beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Neomi
Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2559 (2011) (emphasizing Article II’s vestiture of executive power in a
singular president). For purposes here, the President, the White House, and federal agencies will
be conflated for ease of exposition. The central insight that a collective-action dynamic may arise,
however, applies even if agencies are separated from the White House. See infra Section V.C.
127 See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 1, at 293-94 (discussing President Obama’s use of deferred actions
when Congress decided to not enact an immigration reform bill); Kagan, supra note 126, at 2248
(“Whether the subject was health care, welfare reform, tobacco, or guns, a self-conscious and central
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enforce the major questions doctrine, presidents will have less ability to create
major policies through regulation. So if the Court backs away from the doctrine,
presidents will have a freer hand to create major policies. The shared premise
may also be true for policies that are neither major nor minor but are regularly
addressed by policymakers (even if not on the front page).
The shared premise is not necessarily true, however, for minor questions.
Minor questions—that is, low-profile, often bipartisan issues that the political
branches want resolved the same way but are not high priorities for either
branch—are particularly at risk of policy stagnation. As Mancur Olson
observed, because of the collective-action dynamics that a shared ability to
act creates, “[i]t is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their
self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested
behavior.” 128 Because these characteristics tend to reduce political saliency,
moreover, the risk of inaction should be especially pronounced where a
policy’s benefits are diffuse and its costs concentrated or where a policy is
technical. For such low-salience, “good government”-type issues, which are
everywhere in modern society, Congress and the White House both face
incentives to freeride. This unexplored collective-action insight explains why
a minor questions doctrine may be worthwhile.
#$*F

A. An Intuitive Explanation
When both political branches share the same policymaking space, each
branch has an incentive to freeride off the efforts of the other. The result for
each branch may be mixed strategies—i.e., acting only a certain percentage
of the time. 129 When each branch uses a mixed strategy, sometimes both will
act, sometimes only one will act, and sometimes neither will act. That
collective-action insight may apply to administrative law, where shared
policymaking spaces are common. For certain popular policies, both Congress
and the White House want to act and would do so regardless of what the
other does; when that happens, there may be wasted resources (itself a
collective-action problem), but at least there is no danger of inaction. For
other policies, however, Congress and the White House both want the same
thing, but each would prefer the other to bear the costs. In theory, this
incentive structure might lead to both sides using mixed strategies, and so
sometimes mutual inaction. 130
#$+F
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object of the [Clinton] White House was to devise, direct, and/or finally announce administrative actions
. . . to showcase and advance presidential policies [against the backdrop of a hostile Congress].”).
128 OLSON, supra note 104, at 1-2 (emphasis omitted).
129 BAIRD ET AL., supra note 102, at 36-37.
130 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 12, at 707-08 (discussing a possible example of the President and
Congress adopting mixed strategies for raising additional revenues).
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By definition, deference allows the White House to act where it would
otherwise be forced to stand aside, thus expanding the White House’s menu
of options. At the same time, because agencies (generally) cannot act without
congressional authorization, 131 and because one Congress cannot bind a
future Congress, 132 Congress also can access that same menu, plus any other
policy within its constitutional powers. Thus, every policy that the White
House can create via Chevron can also be created by Congress through
legislation. Deference accordingly creates overlapping policy spaces between
Congress and the White House where such overlap would not otherwise exist.
This may lead to at least two types of collective-action problems. First,
sometimes both Congress and the White House may act, resulting in wasted
resources. And second, sometimes neither Congress nor the White House
may act, resulting in policy stagnation.
First, overlapping policymaking power sometimes may mean wasted
resources. Some policies are good for the public and popular; everyone wants
credit for those policies. Congress thus may rush to enact legislation, and the
White House may similarly use its rulemaking powers, augmented by
Chevron, to create redundant policy. 133 To be sure, this overlapping authority
#%#F
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131 See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). The exception to this “no power
to act” rule, of course, is when the President is acting pursuant to his or her Article II powers. The
extent of the White House’s power to control what agencies do with delegated authority from
Congress is disputed, especially when it comes to policymaking authority that only exists because
Congress created agencies to exercise it. Recently, the Supreme Court suggested that with limited
exceptions, the President has the constitutional power to control whatever policymaking discretion
federal agencies enjoy. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197
(2020) (explaining that “[t]he entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone,” and that
although “lesser executive officers [may] ‘assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of
his trust,’” “[t]hese lesser officers must remain accountable to the President, whose authority they
wield” (quoting 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1939))); id. at 2204 (explaining that it is important that agencies fall “in line with the President’s
preferred policies”). That broad view of presidential power, however, is contested. See, e.g., id. at
2227 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The President, as to the construction of his own branch of government,
can only try to work his will through the legislative process.”). For purposes of this Article, it is
enough to observe that the White House can and often does exert a great deal of pressure on agencies
to pursue the president’s policy goals. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 126, at 2248 (demonstrating that in
recent decades “the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies” has become “more and more
an extension of the President’s own policy and political agenda”).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (“[O]ne legislature may not
bind the legislative authority of its successors.” (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *90 (1765))). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1693 (2002) (offering some counterexamples).
133 There are examples of overlapping efforts. Agencies, for instance, parrot statutory language,
even though they receive no special deference for doing so. See, e.g., Hanah Metchis Volokh, The
Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 290, 290 (2011) (noting how agencies sometimes
promulgate rules that parrot statutory language). One explanation may be that the policy is popular.
Promulgating redundant language allows agencies to “hold [themselves] out as the source of a
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may have have offsetting benefits. 134 And no doubt, there are policies that are
viewed differently by Congress and the White House such that only one
branch wants to act. 135 But for policies that are perceived as beneficial and
popular by both branches, we should expect overlapping policymaking
authority to produce at least some waste.
Second, and the special focus of this Article, overlapping policymaking
power also sometimes may lead to no one doing anything. In deciding
whether to enact legislation, there are policies for which Congress’s decision
whether to move forward is a close one—the universe of costs is almost as
large as the universe of benefits, with both “costs” and “benefits” being
comprised of a combination of general welfare concerns mixed with political
concerns. 136 And within that universe of policies, sometimes the overall
benefits come disproportionately from the welfare side of the ledger, while
the overall costs are disproportionately political. When a welfare-enhancing
policy is politically popular, Congress is eager to act. But when a welfareenhancing policy is politically costly, Congress presumably would like to see
someone else step up, at least at the margins. 137 Likewise, even if a policy is
politically beneficial, it can still be very costly to enact—it takes resources to
address some issues and opportunity costs are real. This is especially true for
technical issues, which tend to require more policymaking resources to
understand and address. 138 Where such costs become great enough, the
#%&F
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popular new law, just as legislators may enact redundant laws to play to interest groups.” F. Andrew
Hessick, Doctrinal Redundancies, 67 ALA. L. REV. 635, 669 n.175 (2016) (citing Michael Doran,
Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815, 1844 (2011)).
134 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2012) (“[R]edundancy has certain benefits, like providing a form of
insurance against a single agency’s failure.”); Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency
Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 848 (2015) (similar).
135 As reflected in the major questions doctrine, however, there may be questions of legitimacy
when the White House creates such policies. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
136 Further complicating the analysis, these welfare and political costs and benefits overlap.
Members of Congress are themselves part of the public, so they benefit when the public benefits, and
they suffer when the public suffers. Likewise, political survival for a member of Congress may potentially
be a means and not an end; if so, a decision driven by political survival could also, at bottom, be driven
by public-interest motivations. For ease of exposition, however, this overlap will be set aside.
137 Cf., e.g., OSTROM, supra note 94 (explaining the “powerful” argument that “[w]henever one
person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide . . . [t]he temptation to free-ride
. . . may dominate the decision process”).
138 Congress, of course, could increase its policymaking capacity by hiring more staff or by
borrowing technical expertise from agencies. See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As Legislators: An
Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 498
(2017) (explaining that Congress uses agencies to help draft statutes because “[a]gencies have more
staff and greater subject-matter expertise”). There may be limits, however, to Congress’ ability to
hire more staff. See, e.g., Ruth Bloch Rubin, Lessons from the History of Reform, in CONGRESS
OVERWHELMED: THE DECLINE IN CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
255, 266 (Timothy M. LaPira, Lee Drutman & Kevin R. Kosar eds., 2020) (noting political obstacles
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political benefits of acting may be canceled out such that Congress again
presumably would also like someone else to take the lead. Delegated
authority, express and implicit (via Chevron), may allow that “someone else”
dynamic to emerge. Congress, acting rationally from its perspective, may
prefer the White House to create the policy.
Yet the White House may not be eager to accept that role. 139 Even if it
agrees that the policy is welfare-enhancing, the White House surely
recognizes the asymmetrical costs. 140 Granted, if Congress could not act, the
White House might be willing to go it alone. 141 But Congress can act. And if
it does, the White House benefits because the policy becomes law on
Congress’s tab. Thus, the White House may also be tempted to freeride,
especially if it believes Congress is shirking. 142 This shared incentive to
freeride is critical because, again, when playing the Chicken Game,
sometimes no one turns. 143 Deference thus may have two effects—the
intended effect (more unilateral White House action for some policies) and
the unintended one (less overall federal action for other policies).
Think of it this way. Imagine you’re a member of Congress. There are
certain policies that are high priorities for you. You are going to do whatever
you can to get those done no matter what anyone else does. Let’s call those
policies 1, 2, and 3. But you only have so much time in the day. There are
other policies that are more marginal but that you want and would push if
you had time. Let’s call those policies 18, 19, and 20. And then there are a
spread of 14 other policies in between. When policies 18 to 20 can be done by
#%+F
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to increased staffing); Thomas Molnar Fisher, Republican Constitutional Skepticism and Congressional
Reform, 69 IND. L.J. 1215, 1246 (1993) (explaining the arguments that “staff expansion undermines
Congress’ ability to deliberate” and decreases “accountability”). Members of Congress, moreover,
may not always trust agency experts. See Shobe, supra, at 476 n.83, 508. In any event, regardless of
capacity, it also takes initiative to get the policymaking ball rolling in the first place, and both sides
may be reluctant to take that initial step because of their hope that the other will.
139 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1194 (1973)
(“[O]ne of the consequences of broad delegation will be the indisposition of the agency to decide
controversial questions.”).
140 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 12, at 643 (“All else equal, the President would prefer to share
the political costs of raising revenue with Congress, while Congress would prefer that the President
bear all the political costs of raising revenue himself.”).
141 See id. at 644 (predicting more unilateral action by the White House when Congress is
divided because the White House knows that Congress is less able to bring about policy).
142 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 604 (1996)
(explaining how a “desire not to be suckered” may influence behavior (quoting Peter H. Huang &
Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures,
10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 403 (1994))).
143 See, e.g., David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing
Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 206 (2015) (likening budget negotiations to
Chicken Games where shutdowns sometimes happen); Hemel, supra note 12, at 644 (“Absent the
possibility of such credible commitments, . . . some revenue-raising measures that could be
implemented via regulation or via legislation may not be implemented at all.”).
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someone else, you are less inclined to do them yourself. That “someone else,”
however, may have a similar approach. If that “someone else” views the same
policies as marginal that you do, both of you and the “someone else” may
stand aside in hopes that the other person acts. Instead, both you and the
“someone else” may spend time replicating each other’s work on policies 1, 2,
and 3. The result would be a net loss to society.
Importantly, what types of policies may be most susceptible to mutual
inaction? In other words, what policies exist for which, from a policymaker’s
perspective, the total benefits outweigh the total costs, but with the benefits
disproportionately coming from general welfare considerations, and the costs
disproportionately coming from political considerations or high opportunity
costs? Obvious answers include (i) policies for which the welfare benefits are
diffuse but the political costs are concentrated and (ii) policies that are
technical and so require more of the actor’s resources to address. 144 The
former category should be especially vulnerable to collect-action dynamics
because it is easier for concentrated groups to mobilize, thus putting political
pressure on policymakers. 145 Classic examples include industry-specific
subsidies or tax breaks; there is little benefit to any individual voter, but these
policies can be the difference between survival and extinction for businesses
in the industries. 146 And as for the latter category, it is easy to imagine
technical issues that would require many resources to solve and so, all else
being equal, are more likely to go unaddressed. 147
The result is that in a world with deference, we should not be surprised
to see cases—at the margins—where Congress and the White House do not
act, even though either branch would act if policymaking power was not
shared. 148 Importantly, although major questions or intermediate questions
can also sometimes be subject to such collective-action dynamics because they
#&&F
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144 Cf. Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2683, 2696 (2013) (“Interest group theory from political science . . . [contends] that how a law
distributes its costs and benefits determines how easy that law is to pass and to sustain.”).
145 See id. at 2697 (“[S]ome small, easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful
incentive to organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are distributed at a low per capita rate over
a large number of people, and hence they have little incentive to organize in opposition—if, indeed,
they even hear of the policy.” (quoting Wilson, supra note 16, at 369)).
146 Id. at 2686; see also Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 31 (1999) (“Modest benefits to a well-organized interest group can readily
outweigh larger costs to a diffuse and poorly organized interest group in the political calculus.”).
147 Cf., e.g., Siddharth Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability to
Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 179, 191-92 (2007) (explaining how
“research and development” is subject to “collective action problems” unless the benefits are
“internalized”); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 702 (2003)
(noting that what is “expensive to produce” can lead to “a real freerider problem”).
148 See Hemel, supra note 12, at 711 (“A zero-deference regime would effectively eliminate the
President’s regulatory option, increasing the probability that Congress would act.”).
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too can be characterized by diffuse benefits and concentrated costs or unusual
technical complexity, policies with those particular characteristics should
more regularly satisfy this Article’s definition of a minor question.
B. A Mathematical Explanation
The foregoing intuitive analysis also finds support in game theory. Game
theory teaches that because of mixed strategies, 149 sometimes the
consequence of shared policymaking spaces is that nothing happens.
This point is best illustrated by a number of variations of the Snowdrift
Game. 150 Recall, in this game there are two drivers who run into a snowdrift
from opposite sides. Each would benefit from a clear road. Sometimes the
costs and benefits of clearing the road are such that both will happily clear
the snow, especially if shoveling snow is fun. Other times both will get out of
the car, resulting in redundancy. Other times still, no one will shovel.
Consider the following version of the game. Imagine that shoveling is easy
and fast (essentially, all the work is done by getting out of the car) and it is
rewarding too (because, say, it is good exercise). If so, the payoff matrix (i.e.,
#&+F

#'!F

149 Some may object to the use of mixed strategies. After all, when it comes to politics, no one
is randomly pulling cards from a hat that say “act” or “don’t act,” and mixed strategies may require
some “random device to decide upon an action.” ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND
LANGUAGE: FIVE ESSAYS 77-78 (2001); see also Tonja Jacobi & Jonah Kind, Criminal Innovation and
the Warrant Requirement: Reconsidering the Rights-Police Efficiency Trade-Off, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
759, 800 n.195 (2015) (“Some scholars have argued that Nash equilibria are not in fact accurate
predictions of human behavior.”). It can also be difficult to model a relationship that may result in
multiple, even infinite, iterations of the game. See generally Bengt Carlsson & Stefan Johansson, An
Iterated Hawk-and-Dove Game, in AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 179 (Wayne Wobcke,
Maurice Pagnucco & Chengqi Zhang eds., 1997). Game theorists have offered defenses of mixed
strategies. See, e.g., RUBINSTEIN, supra, at 79 (“[T]he uncertainties behind the mixed strategy
equilibrium [can be] viewed as an expression of the lack of certainty on the part of the other players
rather than an intentional plan of the individual player.”); Robert J. Aumann, What Is Game Theory
Trying to Accomplish?, in FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS 5, 19 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Seppo Honkapohja
eds., 1985) (noting that “mixed strategy [can] model[] the ignorance of the outside observer and of
the other players”). This Article does not address these broad issues. Suffice it to say, despite
difficulties, economists have long recognized that mixed-strategy analysis has value. See, e.g., Press
Release, The Nobel Prize, Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel 1994 (Oct. 11, 1994), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1994/summary
[https://perma.cc/5JJB-73CX] (“Nash equilibrium has become a standard tool in almost all areas of
economic theory.”).
150 The portrayal here is stylized. In reality, a lot of behavior occurs before a mixed-strategyrandomizing-like approach applies. Individuals speak with each other and monitor what the other
one is doing. Only after a lot of back and forth do the parties decide to “act” versus “non-act.” My
model necessarily assumes all of that as background. The central point is that at least some cases, at
the margins, it is useful to model parties with overlapping policymaking authority acting in a way
that reflects mixed-strategy analysis. Put differently, “all models are wrong, but some are useful.”
GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE
SURFACES 424 (1987).
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how happy a player in the game is about a particular outcome) 151 could look
something like this:
#'#F

Table 1: The Snowdrift Game: Inaction Impossible

Driver Two
Shovel
Don’t Shovel
Shovel

(2, 2)

(5, 0)

(0, 5)

(-5, -5)

Driver One
Don’t Shovel

Here, it is impossible to end up in a situation where no one shovels. Both
players want to shovel. If, for some reason, one player does not shovel, that
wouldn’t change anything for the other player. Both sides thus have what is
called a “dominant” strategy. 152 When it comes to policymaking, this version
of the Snowdrift game may be akin to a situation where the policy is welfare
enhancing, popular, and not overly technical. For such policies, both Congress
and the White House will try to bring them about no matter what the other
does. Although mutual action has deadweight losses too, it does not lead to a
welfare-enhancing policy being thwarted. 153
Now, however, consider a different version of the game. Here, it is very
cold, and whatever reward that comes from helping others is more than offset
by the joy of a warm car. Yet sitting in a car too long means illness or even
death. With this scenario in place, imagine these payoffs:
#'$F

#'%F

151 See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Essay, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
545, 549 n.13 (2004) (“[T]he concept of ‘utility’ [i]s a means of assigning an objective score to the
relative level of satisfaction that a person gets from consuming a good or undertaking an activity.”
(citing ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 73 (5th ed. 2001))).
152 See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 102, at 11 (describing the role of each player’s dominant
strategy in game theory). The dominant strategy arises because driver one considers the scenario
where driver two shovels. In that case, driver one maximizes her utility by shoveling (2 > 0). Driver
one then considers the scenario where driver two does not shovel; in that case, driver one maximizes
her utility by shoveling (5 > -5). No matter which choice driver two makes, driver one will be better
off shoveling. The same analysis will be conducted by driver two, with the same result, so both
parties will shovel. Note, there is no need for symmetry. This Article uses symmetrical values for
simplicity’s sake. But the same outcome would emerge if, say, one of the 5s was replaced with an 8,
and one of the -5s was replaced with a -1. All that matters is certain values in the matrix are larger
than other values.
153 To be clear, though: At the margins, there may be policies that are on net beneficial only if
just one branch incurs the expense of bringing them about.
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Table 2: The Snowdrift Game: Inaction Very Unlikely

Driver Two
Shovel
Don’t Shovel
Shovel

(1, 1)

(0, 2)

(2, 0)

(-50, -50)

Driver One
Don’t Shovel

There is no dominant strategy here. If Driver One shovels, Driver Two is
better off staying in the car. If Driver Two shovels, Driver One is better off
staying in the car. Yet if they both stay in the car, both will suffer. 154 What
happens? It is impossible to say. But both sides may opt to use a mixed
strategy. With a certain probability, each Driver could decide to shovel, and,
inversely, also decide not to shovel. This probability, moreover, can be derived
mathematically. 155 It turns out that Driver One and Driver Two should each
shovel about 98% of the time and not shovel 2% of the time. The probability
that neither shovels therefore would be less than 1%. 156 This is reassuring.
There may be some redundancy, but at least someone will almost certainly do
the work. As to policymaking, this may be a situation where the policy is
welfare enhancing but either unpopular or unusually technical, but where
mutual inaction is deemed catastrophic.
#'&F
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154 There are thus two “pure strategy” Nash equilibria; if Driver One shovels, Driver Two
always stays in the car; if Driver Two shovels, Driver One always stays in the car. See BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 102, at 35. Again, symmetrical numbers are not essential for this analysis. Notably, some
might fight the hypothetical and ask why the two drivers don’t just get out of their cars and make a
deal. At the margins, transaction costs could keep that from happening. In the Snowdrift Game, the
wall of snow, the bitter cold, etc., could be transaction costs, as could the inability to guarantee that
the other driver will actually get out of the car and shovel when it is his turn. The analogous costs
may be far higher in government, where politics, personal grudges, and the inability to know what
the courts will do all can be transaction costs. See generally Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17
GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2014).
155 Player One’s optimal strategy is determined by choosing the value for P1 (given Player Two’s
optimal strategy (P2)) that maximizes Player One’s expected payout, that is, Player One chooses P1
to maximize the following payout: P2 [P1(1) + (1-P1)(2)] + (1-P2) [P1(0) + (1-P1)(-50)].
Player Two solves an identical equation. With a bit of algebra (and a little bit of calculus), we
see that P1=P2=50/51 or about 98%. See also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 102, at 35-38 & 277 n.16
(describing the math algebraically).
156 The probability that both would shovel can be calculated by multiplying the probability that
Driver One would shovel (for simplicity’s sake, say, 98%) by the probability that Driver Two would
shovel (also, say, 98%). That would be approximately 96%. The probability that neither would shovel
would be calculated by multiplying the probability that Driver One would not shovel (say, 2%) by
the probability that Driver Two would not shovel (again, say, 2%); that is .04%.
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Things change, however, when the payoff structures changes. Consider
the following version of the game:
Table 3: The Snowdrift Game: Inaction Fairly Unlikely

Driver Two
Shovel
Don’t Shovel
Shovel

(1, 1)

(0, 2)

(2, 0)

(-1, -1)

Driver One
Don’t Shovel

Now, using the same formula, the mixed strategy for Driver One and
Driver Two would be to each shovel half the time. This means that for any
particular snowstorm, we should expect both to shovel 25% of the time and
neither to shovel 25% of the time and that one of the two will shovel half of
the time. Returning to policymaking, this situation could be one where the
policy is welfare enhancing but politically costly or the issue is very technical,
and mutual inaction is pretty bad but hardly a catastrophe.
Finally, if we change the payoff structure one more time, mutual inaction
can become likely:
Table 4: The Snowdrift Game: Inaction Likely

Driver Two
Shovel
Don’t Shovel
Shovel

(1, 1)

(0, 10)

(10, 0)

(-1, -1)

Driver One
Don’t Shovel

Here, the optimal strategy for both Driver One and Driver Two is to
shovel 10% of the time and not shovel 90% of the time. Hence, we should
expect that no one shovels; indeed, that should happen about 80% of the time.
In this scenario, even though the worst outcome for everyone is mutual
inaction, perversely, that outcome is also what we should expect. Analogizing
to policymaking, this version may be a situation where the policy is, on net,
socially beneficial but the political or opportunity costs of bringing it about
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are very high and letting nothing happen is not a huge deal. Under these
conditions, freeriding may be quite attractive. To be clear, both branches
would benefit from action because a good policy would become law.
Accordingly, if only one could act, that branch would do so. But because both
can act, and the costs of mutual inaction are considered minor, we should
expect that often nothing happens.
The upshot is straightforward. For policies for which neither branch has
a dominant strategy to act, and especially for which neither considers inaction
catastrophic, mutual inaction sometimes should occur. 157 Not by accident,
those conditions often match the test offered in this Article for a minor
question. 158 If an issue is particularly important to either or both branches,
then there is a good chance that at least one has a dominant strategy to act.
Likewise, even if no branch has a dominant strategy to act, but if both
consider inaction catastrophic, suggesting that the policy is not a minor
question, the odds of mutual inaction should be small. But if an issue is not
deemed especially important, then sometimes neither branch may act, even
though both agree that the policy is welfare-enhancing and either branch
would if the other one couldn’t.
#')F
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C. Real World Applications
This collective-action dynamic may play out in the real world. To be sure,
it is difficult for an academic observer to confidently identify things that did
not happen but would have happened if some variable had been different. It
is also difficult to understand political decisionmaking, where the reason
offered for an action may not be the real one. 159 The fog surrounding
policymaking is especially heavy here, moreover, because the sorts of policies
where inaction results may not command a great deal of attention. And there
are many reasons that a policy proposal might not become law, even if the
policy is popular. 160 Despite these limitations, however, this Section
identifies substantive areas of law that may be most susceptible to a “minor
questions” collective-action problem.
The first field is tax law. Daniel Hemel observes that there are many
policies that the White House could bring about to increase federal revenue.
Yet even though the White House supports these policies—indeed, by means
#'+F
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157 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 12, at 708 (“Two-sided inaction may result . . . even in
equilibrium.”). As explained above, how Congress and the White House determine the value of
policy implicates competing theories of governmental behavior.
158 See supra p. 1204.
159 See, e.g., Hemel & Nielson, supra note 27, at 788-801 (offering possible examples).
160 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
(“Although legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be
difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.”).
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of the “Greenbook,” the White House encourages Congress to enact those
policies by legislation—the White House is unwilling to promulgate
regulations to do so, even though it could itself unilaterally turn these policies
into law. 161 Hemel documents a number of statutes for which an agency
would receive deference, and for which the White House openly favored a
particular tax policy, yet the White House declined to regulate but instead
requested Congress to do so. For instance, taxing officials, when interpreting
the phrase “exclusively for conservation purposes” in the tax code, could read
the statute to prevent taxpayers from claiming massive deductions for “‘air
rights’ easement[s]” above historic homes where “such development [is]
already restricted by local authorities.” 162 Nonetheless, the White House has
not acted. Hemel details a number of similarly ambiguous tax-related statutes
that seem to fit this same pattern. 163
At first blush, this inaction seems puzzling. If the White House thinks a
revenue-raising rule is in the public interest, and if it has authority under
Chevron to promulgate such a regulation, why not do it? Yet unilateral action
by the White House means that it will bear essentially all the costs while only
receiving some of the benefits. That is a recipe for inaction. 164 Moreover,
applying this Article’s diffused-versus-concentrated framework (i.e., we
should expect collective-action dynamics more often for issues with diffuse
benefits but concentrated costs because they impose greater relative political
costs on the branch that acts), this is the sort of situation for which inaction
is most likely; there is a diffuse benefit (increased revenue for the public) but
a concentrated cost (a particular group must pay more). Likewise, if we focus
on this Article’s simple-versus-technical framework (i.e., we should expect
collective-action dynamics more often for technical issues that require the
acting branch to use more resources to address), it is also easy to see why
complicated tax issues are not readily addressed. Accordingly, Hemel’s
specific, real-world examples support the thesis that deference sometimes
may create a collective-action problem for revenue collection.
#(#F
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161 See Hemel, supra note 12, at 639-40 (“Almost invariably, the Greenbook includes proposals
that the President plausibly could carry out on his own—without any congressional action—by
directing the Treasury Department to promulgate appropriate regulations.”); see also id. (listing
examples).
162 See id. at 671-72 (first quoting 26 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C); then quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 162 (2013)).
163 See Hemel, supra note 12, at 658-75.
164 See id. at 703-04 (“[E]ven if the shared political benefits of additional spending are high
enough that the President would be willing to bear the political costs of raising revenue on his own,
he would still prefer to share those costs with Congress. As a result, the President may include
proposals in the Greenbook even though—if the prospect of legislation were off the table—the
President would be willing to implement the proposal via executive action.”).
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Hemel’s logic, however, can be taken further. His article, The President’s
Power to Tax, focuses on one half of the dynamic: why the White House acts or
does not act. But his analysis also explains Congress’s Power to Tax. Hemel notes
in passing—but does not dwell on the troubling possibility—that because of
deference, Congress may also decline to act, resulting in welfare-enhancing
policies being shelved even though both Congress and the White House would
turn them into law but for the fact that the other also could do so. 165 For
instance, Hemel observes that “the rise of the anti-tax Tea Party in recent years
may actually have led to more revenue being raised” because Congress was
effectively disabled from acting, thus allowing “the President and Congress to
avoid the uncooperative result (don’t regulate, don’t legislate).” 166 But the flipside
is that when the White House and Congress do agree on the policy, “the
uncooperative result (don’t regulate, don’t legislate),” may emerge in a world with
shared policymaking space. When only the White House can act, there is no
collective-action problem because there is no temptation to freeride. By the
same token though, when only Congress can act, there is also no collective-action
problem. It is only when both branches can act that the dynamic emerges. The
specific examples Hemel offers of tax policies that the White House lists in the
Greenbook but that Congress does not enact are thus situations in which
deference’s collective-action dynamics may be working its mischief. The fact that
Congress declines to enact legislation that the White House favors, even though
there is reason to think that Congress also favors it (for instance, say, when the
White House and a supermajority of Congress were controlled by the same
party 167), is notable.
Hemel’s tax examples, moreover, do not fully capture the “minor questions”
problem. There are different types of tax issues. 168 Some “loopholes,” for
instance, are actually deliberate choices by policymakers, often with partisan
overtones. 169 Others, however, are minor questions that the majority of
policymakers irrespective of party affiliation would address in the same way if it
#('F
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165 See Hemel, supra note 12, at 644-45 (“[Deference] empowered the executive branch to act
unilaterally, but it also may have discouraged Congress from raising revenue via legislation.”).
166 Id. at 710.
167 Deference in tax policy is complicated by the fact that it was not until 2011 that the Supreme
Court explicitly held that Chevron applies in the tax context. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. &
Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53-57 (2011). Before 2011, courts sometimes applied Chevron,
but on other occasions applied less robust forms of deference. See Hemel, supra note 12, at 655
(discussing Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)). By 2011, the
Democrats’ supermajority was gone. Because at least some deference existed both before and after
2011, this fact does not defeat the analysis, but it does complicate the math.
168 See generally Heather M. Field, A Taxonomy of Tax Loopholes, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2018)
(explaining the different types of policies that are all labeled “loopholes”).
169 See Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor’s Toesies: A “Roguish” Concurrence with Professor
Baxter, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 62-63 (1993) (“[S]ome ‘loopholes’ actually reflect
deliberate choices or compromises by Congress.”).
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were relatively easy to do so. Hemel’s point that divided government may
mitigate collective-action problems makes more sense for partisan issues where
a divided Congress de facto means that if the White House wants the policy, it
has to act. But technical issues without partisan implications may be particularly
susceptible to stagnation (again at the margins) because there is no obvious
reason why divided government would prevent congressional action for a
bipartisan issue. In other words, perversely, the less controversial the policy, the
stronger the collective-action problem, all else being equal. This is why minor
questions (uncontroversial issues with low salience) may be disproportionately
affected by deference’s collective-action dynamics.
Hemel’s tax analysis is quite useful because—thanks to the Greenbook—
it contains concrete examples. Because few areas of law have a tool like the
Greenbook, it is more difficult to identify specific policies that the Executive
Branch favors yet does not act on. But it is possible to identify other subjects
where the same dynamics that affect tax law may apply.
For instance, international trade is another area marked by diffused
benefits, concentrated costs, and technical complexity. 170 Revising tariffs or
subsidies, therefore, is another place where deference sometimes may negate
the emergence of beneficial policy. To the extent that the statute is
ambiguous, 171 both Congress and the White House sometimes can benefit the
public by revising tariffs or subsidies. Yet figuring out optimal policy on a
product-by-product basis is technical and potentially politically costly; reform
will anger a concentrated group (resulting in, say, political advertising against
the policymaker). 172 Although the White House often has broad authority
over trade issues (in part, the theory goes, because it less susceptible to
factionalism 173), it is easy to see why the White House at times may be
reluctant to use this authority, especially when doing so will affect a
concentrated industry. This pattern is consistent with the notion that when
an overall welfare-enhancing policy becomes sufficiently costly for the acting
#)!F

#)#F

#)$F

#)%F

170 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 516 (2000) (noting how protectionist interest groups “ostensibly” seeking to
serve public goals may just want to prevent foreign competition). These dynamics have been
understood since the time of Adam Smith—who also could not mobilize the public to address them.
See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895,
931 n.119 (1992) (citing 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 450-69 (R.H. Campbell et al.
eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776)).
171 For reasons sounding in “step zero,” Chevron does not apply to every trade decision. See,
e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Chevron, however, does apply to some trade
decisions. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 809 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
172 See generally RÉAL P. LAVERGNE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. TARIFFS: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 132-35 (1983) (describing the extent to which tariff structure “responds to
interest-group pressure as opposed to the ‘public interest’”).
173 See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 170, at 539-41.
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branch, neither branch wants to take the lead, even if it approves of the policy
and would not stand in the way if the other wanted to act.
Similar analysis may apply to providing access to information. Again, the
issue can be technical, the benefit is diffuse, and the costs may be concentrated
if disclosure is embarrassing to a specific group. 174
Environmental law may also be worth considering. Many environmental
law scholars lament the fact that environmental proposals are hard to turn
into law because of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits. 175 They also
observe that Congress may be reluctant to address technical issues. 176
Accordingly, environmental law may be another field where the collectiveaction dynamic created by deference sometimes leads to some inaction. 177
Granted, many environmental policies are not “minor” questions; indeed,
they may even be “major” ones. But there are also many smaller, lower-profile
questions without partisan overtones.
These categories are not meant to be exhaustive, nor—to be clear—is it
certain that these categories are subject to stagnation of the sort discussed in
this Article. Indeed, it would be useful for subject-matter experts to study
collective-action dynamics in greater detail to help identify specific examples
of stagnation (as with the Greenbook in tax). And, to be sure, it may be good
that some policies are thwarted. This Article is not the place for a discussion
of the merits of any particular issue. Instead, the point here is that that even
when both Congress and the White House want the same thing, sometimes
nothing may get done.
#)&F

#)'F

#)(F
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174 Cf. Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in
Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 932 (1990) (“[O]btaining information is more costly for
diffuse groups.”).
175 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental
Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1254 n.401 (2014) (“[I]ndividuals that favor cleaner air, will have
difficulty influencing government decisionmaking compared to well-organized, concentrated
groups.”); see also id. (collecting citations).
176 See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to
Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 830 (1997) (noting congressional
reluctance to address “technical” issues).
177 Consider, for example, environmental policy in the 1990s. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 633-36 (2001) (examining
environmental law in the 1990s and noting that Congress did not enact major legislation for a good
portion of the decade even when Democrats controlled both the White House and Congress); Paul
Rauber, Bill Clinton: Does He Deserve Your Vote?, SIERRA MAG., https://vault.sierraclub.org/
sierra/199609/clinton.asp (last visited May 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D56J-D6AA] (bemoaning that “a
nominally green White House and Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress” failed to enact
legislation and, further, that the White House failed to use its regulatory powers to their fullest). To be
sure, this Article does not claim that this experience is an example of a collective-action problem, much
less an example of the sort of collective-action problem addressed here (indeed, Congress did address
some “narrow technical issues,” Revesz, supra, at 634)—the political process is too complicated. But it is
worth thinking about surprising periods of inaction.
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IV. THE MINOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
For reasons explained, minor questions present special concerns that the
Chevron framework does not address. Congress can fix this problem and the
Supreme Court potentially can too. 178 And because the problem is structural,
it is doubtful that the problem will solve itself. A minor question doctrine
thus could be valuable.
The question, however, is what a minor questions doctrine should entail.
There are at least three possibilities. The first version would mimic the major
questions doctrine: just as courts do not defer when major questions are
implicated, they also would not defer when minor questions are implicated.
The second version would take a different tack. Rather than courts themselves
directly addressing minor questions, agencies would have discretion to
prospectively waive Chevron. The third version would reverse the Chevron
presumption; agencies would only receive deference when Congress expressly
delegates the power. Each of these solutions has pluses and minuses, but the
key point is that any of them would reduce overlapping policymaking
authority for minor questions.
#)*F

A. Mirroring the Major Questions Doctrine
The most obvious path to a minor questions doctrine is to borrow from the
major questions doctrine. Just as courts do not defer in cases with major
questions, they could also not defer in cases with minor ones. And because
Congress would know ex ante 179 that courts would not defer when a minor
question is involved, Congress would also know that only it could create the
policy—thus defeating (or at least mitigating) the collective-action problem. 180
Unfortunately, revising the Chevron framework this way is easier said than
done. First, the concern here is governmental inaction. It is easy to see how a
court would be presented with a major-question case; a party would challenge
#)+F

#*!F

178 Whether the Supreme Court can address this collective-action problem implicates a question
of stare decisis beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, to the extent that Chevron is a species
of “common law,” Sohoni, supra note 7, at 1437, the Court may have a freer hand to modify Chevron—as,
indeed, it has done with the major questions doctrine. The minor question doctrine would also address
an unintended consequence of the Court’s own making, which may further counsel in favor of judicial
reform. The Court’s “precedent on precedent” may also allow some revision of deference doctrines
without offending stare decisis. See Hickman & Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, supra note 55, at
992. Here, however, identifying how stare decisis works is orthogonal to this Article’s point. Whether or
not the Court can fix Chevron, Congress can. (This prompts the question why Congress has not done so
already. More on that below. See infra Section V.B.)
179 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (explaining that would-be litigants often do not need to go court
precisely because they know ex ante what a court would do).
180 See Hemel, supra note 12, at 710 (explaining how obstacles to congressional action make
presidential action more likely by defeating a collective-action problem).

2021]

1219

The Minor Questions Doctrine

what the agency did, the agency would defend itself by citing Chevron, and a
court would decide whether deference is appropriate. But how can a court
address something that hasn’t happened? Typically, a party can only challenge
final agency action 181—not an agency rule that is merely in process of being
finished, 182 and certainly not a rule that the agency has not even started. True,
parties can sometimes petition for a rulemaking. 183 But judicial review of agency
denials of such petitions is “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.” 184
This version of the minor questions thus would have to address the “where
will the cases come from?” issue. It could so in a couple of ways. Congress
could reduce agency discretion over petitions for rulemaking, at least when
minor questions are in play. 185 This would have to be done carefully because
agencies often have good reasons to not grant a petition for rulemaking that
have nothing to do with collective-action dynamics. 186 The other approach
would be to reduce Chevron’s domain organically where minor questions are
involved. This could be done by relaxing the Brand X doctrine. 187 Either
Congress or the Supreme Court could decree that when a minor question is
at issue, a judicial interpretation will control despite any later acts by the
agency. In this way, courts could sometimes definitively interpret agency#*#F

#*$F

#*%F

#*&F

#*'F

#*(F

#*)F

181 5 U.S.C. § 704; see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (“[T]he action must mark
the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process . . . it must not be of a merely tentative
or interlocutory nature.”).
182 See, e.g., In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[A] proposed rule
is just a proposal. In justiciable cases, this Court has authority to review the legality of final agency
rules. We do not have authority to review proposed agency rules.”).
183 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
184 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers &
Forwarders Assn. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
185 The judiciary could not do this; the standard for review of denials of petitions for
rulemaking is a question of statutory law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; cf. Erin Morrow Hawley, The Supreme
Court’s Quiet Revolution: Redefining the Meaning of Jurisdiction, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2027, 2027
(2015) (faulting the Court for creating doctrines divorced from the law). That said, as part of
arbitrary-and-capricious review, perhaps a court could require an agency to explain itself if a party
alleges that a collective-action problem is thwarting policy. Presumably an agency could easily defeat
that sort of argument, though, by pointing to resource constraints.
186 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527 (“As we have repeated time and again, an agency has
broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its
delegated responsibilities.”).
187 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 969 (2005)
(holding that under the logic of Chevron, an agency can override a court’s prior interpretation of an
ambiguous statute); see also Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency
Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1055-56 (2007) (explaining how Brand X reduces an agency’s
ability to make credible commitments not to act). There are arguments against doing this (e.g.,
doctrinal coherence) that do not sound in collective-action concerns. The point here is simply that
this sort of reform could address the “where will the cases come from?” issue. The overall value of
this sort of reform is a more complicated question.
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administered statutes, which over time would limit the amount of overlapping
policymaking space, 188 and so the collective-action problem.
The second problem with this version of the minor questions doctrine goes
to administrability. Determining whether a policy has, say, “vast ‘economic and
political significance’” 189 is not easy. 190 But surely it is easier than directly
targeting minor questions. The number of false positives would be significant—
as would be the risk of judicial micromanagement. Perhaps more manageably,
this version of the minor questions doctrine thus could identify categories of
policies that are most susceptible to a collective-action problem. Although such
categories would inevitably be under- and overinclusive, 191 a category-bycategory approach presumably would be more administrable than an issue-byissue approach.
#**F

#*+F

#+!F

#+#F

B. A New Form of Chevron Waiver
Agencies could also be allowed to waive deference for certain policies.
Judges thus would not decide what is a minor question. Instead, agencies
themselves would have an off-ramp to escape a collective-action problem
where agencies, not courts, conclude that turning off Chevron would be
worthwhile. Allowing agencies to identify where collective-action problems
exist should be much more judicially administrable.
The idea behind this version of the minor questions doctrine comes from
the collective-action literature. One solution to the Chicken Game is for a
player to openly and irrevocably toss aside its steering wheel. 192 Applied to
administrative law, that insight cuts in favor of allowing regulators to “turn
off ” Chevron. If an agency can credibly claim that it lacks authority to create
a policy, then the collective-action problem disappears. 193 In other aspects of
administrative law, the judiciary acts as a credible commitment mechanism
#+$F

#+%F

See Masur, supra note 187, at 1037-41 (explaining how Brand X reduces legal stability).
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000)).
190 See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[D]etermining whether a rule constitutes a major
rule sometimes has a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’ quality. So there inevitably will be close cases
and debates at the margins about whether a rule qualifies as major.”); Loshin & Nielson, supra note
5, at 45 (similar).
191 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209, 1238 (2018)
(explaining the difficulty of finding the optimal amount of delay, and whether the inquiry should be
done on a rule-by-rule basis or on an agency-by-agency basis).
192 See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
193 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1990)
(reviewing ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY (1989)) (“An important form of precommitment is the elimination of subsequent unstable
subgames. This in a sense is what Ulysses accomplished by having himself tied to the mast as his
ship sailed past the Sirens.”).
188
189
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against regulatory change, thus expanding an agency’s menu of policy
options. 194 Here, the judiciary could credibly ensure that an agency’s efforts
to disavow policymaking authority has teeth such that not even the agency
could reverse course. A public and credible disavowal of authority should
prevent Congress from being tempted to freeride. 195
This solution would be controversial. Chevron waiver, after all, has
critics. 196 But this is a different type of Chevron waiver. It rubs some
commentators wrong for an agency to tell a court whether to apply a legal
test. 197 Critics also fear that if agencies could waive deference during
litigation, they may “take a dive” after a presidential change in order to
undermine a rule promulgated by a prior administration without going
through a new round of the notice-and-comment rulemaking. 198 It is unclear
whether the Supreme Court shares this fear of Chevron waiver; the Court has
arguably embraced Chevron waiver during litigation. 199 Regardless, that is not
the species of Chevron waiver proposed here. Rather than waiving deference
during litigation, the agency would disavow deference before any rule exists at
all in order to prompt congressional action. That is not a question of telling
a court how to resolve a legal question or spiking a prior administration’s rule.
Instead, it would be a tool to avert a collective-action problem that potentially
would otherwise prevent anything from happening.
To be clear, Chevron waiver would only help prevent a collective-action
problem in situations where the agency’s interpretation is not the best one
(in a court’s view) but is sufficiently reasonable that it would withstand
#+&F

#+'F
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#++F

194 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 90 (2018) [hereinafter
Nielson, Sticky Regulations] (“[O]ssification can act as a credible commitment mechanism against
change. Because regulated parties know that an agency must survive a procedural gauntlet to change
a regulatory scheme, they can have more confidence in that scheme’s stability. Under certain
circumstances, that stability can encourage more activity of the sort that the agency wishes to
encourage.” (citing Masur, supra note 187, at 1038-45)).
195 Cf., e.g., Fennell, supra note 117, at 1448-50 (explaining that “a rule that limits bargaining
options may simultaneously enhance bargaining leverage” and that “limits can often be
conceptualized as legally imposed precommitment devices, similar to one party (A) tearing out her
own steering wheel during a game of roadway Chicken with another party (B)”).
196 See, e.g., James Durling & E. Garrett West, Essay, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 183, 184 (2019) (“[C]ourts should not allow either private parties or agencies to waive
Chevron.”); Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1520 (2019) (similar); Jeremy
D. Rozansky, Comment, Waiving Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927, 1928 (2018) (similar).
197 See, e.g., Durling & West, supra note 196, at 188 (“This principle—that parties may not forfeit,
waive, or even stipulate to legal propositions—suggests a fundamental problem with Chevron waiver.”).
198 See, e.g., id. at 184 (“This circumvention . . . allow[s] subsequent administrations to scuttle
disfavored policies . . . [of] a prior administration’s regulatory actions.”).
199 See Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020) (applying Skidmore,
rather than Chevron, where “[n]either the Solicitor General nor any party has asked [for] what the
Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute”).
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litigation (i.e., situations for which Chevron deference does actual work). 200
Likewise, for this version of the minor questions doctrine to succeed, the
agency’s public disavowal of deference would have to be (somewhat 201)
irrevocable at least for a period of time—otherwise the collective-action
problem would not disappear. And it is true that agencies might waive
Chevron for non-minor questions. But it is unclear why they would do that.
It makes sense for an agency to waive deference when deference makes it
harder for the agency to accomplish its goal. It makes much less sense where
the agency wants power to regulate or would not regulate anyway because it
does not want the policy. Presumably, it is only when the agency wants the
policy but is stuck in a collective-action dynamic that prospective waiver
would make sense. Minor questions fit that bill in a way that other types of
questions often do not. And if shirking is a problem, Congress could enact
targeted statutes requiring the respective agency to address specific issues.
This version of the minor questions doctrine thus should solve the
collective-action problem in cases where it matters without obvious collateral
damage. It also should appeal to common sense. Courts speak of “giving”
agencies deference 202; agencies thus arguably should be able to decline the
gift when deference would hurt rather than help. 203 The downside of this
path, however, is that it would require creating a new mechanism in
administrative law (prospective Chevron waiver) that is (fairly) avant-garde
and may be hard to implement.
$!!F

$!#F
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C. Reverse the Chevron Presumption
The third option would reverse the Chevron presumption. Recall that
Chevron relies on an implicit delegation of authority; although Congress has
not said so, courts presume that Congress has implicitly given agencies
interpretative primacy for ambiguous language. But it is possible to reverse
200 Many cases that mention “Chevron” do not involve deference. See Hickman & Nielson,
supra note 55, at 986.
201 The more certain the loss of policymaking power is, the more confident Congress will be
that the agency really can’t act. That said, there could be an emergency exception, perhaps subject
to judicial review. As noted, courts can act as a commitment mechanism to make agency claims
credible. If an agency must offer an especially compelling reason to break its vow, then the
commitment would still be somewhat credible. See, e.g., Nielson, Sticky Regulations, supra note 194,
at 118 (explaining that because of judicial review of various procedural requirements, agencies can
credibly commit but still change their mind by “diverting resources away from other priorities”).
202 See, e.g., Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 447 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[U]nder
Chevron step-two, we usually give the agency deference in its interpretation of ambiguous statutory
language . . . .”).
203 Indeed, via Step One-and-a-Half, agencies sometimes already can and do decline the “gift”
simply by saying during the rulemaking that the statute unambiguously compels the agency’s
preferred interpretation. See generally Hemel & Nielson, supra note 27 (describing the doctrine).
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that presumption; courts could defer only when Congress has expressly
delegated that authority. 204
The advantage of this approach is that courts would not have to decide
what is a minor question. Congress, a party to the collective-action problem,
is better positioned to identify which policies are affected by collective-action
dynamics. For such policies, Congress would not “turn on” deference. 205 But
for other policies where Congress believes that deference is sufficiently
valuable, Congress would “turn on” deference.
To be sure, reversing the presumption may be close to eliminating Chevron
itself. The reason why Chevron is so significant is because it applies so broadly;
if Congress were required to affirmatively enact deference through legislation,
there likely would be less deference. 206 That said, if reversing the presumption
for all questions (subject to Congress’s power to turn deference back on) is too
aggressive, Congress could turn off deference only for minor questions—
although, again, that would require identifying what is a minor question.
Congress may not be willing to spend time on that undertaking.
$!&F

$!'F
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D. Which Version Is Best?
Each of these options has pluses and minuses. The most intuitive solution
would be to borrow from the major questions doctrine. The most targeted would
be to create a new form of Chevron waiver. And the most foundational would be
to reverse the Chevron presumption. Yet the minuses are also real. Borrowing
from the major questions doctrine is easier said than done; a new form of
Chevron waiver is unusual and potentially awkward in application; and reversing
the Chevron presumption would be a big change. The key point, though, is that
each option would reduce overlapping policymaking authority over minor
questions. This Article thus offers a menu of options. Determining which one
makes the most sense, if any, requires considering the overall costs and benefits
of reform on other dimensions than those at issue here.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
When two entities want an outcome that is non-rivalrous and
nonexcludable and either can bring it about, a collective-action problem may
result. As this Article demonstrates, these conditions may characterize the

204 This would not solve Justice Thomas’s constitutional concerns. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text. But it would eliminate any uncertainty about the meaning of statutory law.
205 Alternatively, Congress could “turn on” deference, but also require the agency to act rather
than giving the agency discretion whether to do so.
206 See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (explaining how
rare it is for Congress to specify whether it wants deference).
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relationship between the political branches in today’s world, especially for
minor questions. Because of deference, accordingly, it is possible that some
policies—at the margins—are shelved that otherwise would become law. A
minor questions doctrine could address this stagnation. That said, there are
important counterarguments to adopting such a doctrine.
A. Do Minor Questions Matter?
The most important counterargument asks whether this problem is
significant enough to justify reform. Flipping through the Code of Federal
Regulations, there are many examples of agencies addressing minor
questions—including the content of frozen cherry pie. 207 Given that reality,
do collective-action dynamics cause stagnation often enough in the real world
that the benefits of a new doctrine are greater than its costs?
Candidly, this is a difficult question to answer. Because it is challenging
to measure what did not happen, much less explain why it did not happen, it
is necessarily also challenging to speak with confidence about whether a minor
questions doctrine is cost-justified. True, the real-world examples identified
by Hemel suggest that deference sometimes creates a collective-action
problem. And that very volume of provisions in the Code of Federal
Regulations may also support the existence of a collective-action problem, on
the theory that it may help explain why agencies and Congress alike often do
not eliminate regulations that have become obsolete. But without knowing
the respective values that Congress and the White House place on action and
inaction, it is impossible to definitively answer how significant the problem
is, especially because there are many reasons policymakers do not act even for
policies they want (such as resources constraints). So even if the potential
collective-action dynamic identified here matters for some policies, the extent
of its effect is unclear.
Nonetheless, there is reason to fear that this is a real problem. To begin,
the theory here is not elaborate; it is a basic application of widely recognized
principles of game theory. There are also at least some real-world examples
of what looks like deference-caused inaction.
In fact, there is an argument that minor questions should be a priority.
Major questions, by definition, attract the sort of political attention that can
moot the need for judicial review. 208 Not so, however, with minor
$!)F

$!*F

207 See Frozen Cherry Pie; Proposed Revocation of a Standard of Identity and a Standard of
Quality, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,395, 82,395 (Dec. 18, 2020) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 152) (proposing
to “revoke the standard of identity and the standard of quality for frozen cherry pie”).
208 This is to not say that the major questions doctrine does not serve important interests. See,
e.g., Loshin & Nielson, supra note 5, at 60 (offering evidence that “the elephants-in-mouseholes
doctrine was not created to enable the Court’s pursuit of its own policy preferences”). Thus, just
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questions. 209 Put another way, the risk that a collective-action dynamic may
stymie policy is not limited to minor questions; it can also happen for other
types of questions that are not bipartisan or technical. Some tax policies, for
instance, are politically charged. 210 For such issues, however, there is a strong
argument that we should require congressional involvement. 211 At any rate,
when divided government returns (as it regularly does), the collective-action
problem for this category of policies should disappear. 212 But that is not true
for minor questions. Divided government does not solve the problem and it is
hard to come up with a normative argument in favor of this type of inaction.
Another counterargument is that even if Chevron may thwart
policymaking for minor questions, it still may be worthwhile on net. Because
of Chevron, stagnation may occur for some policies while increased activity
may occur for others. 213 Accordingly, to resolve the overall question, we
would need a better sense of Chevron’s total costs and benefits, which we do
not know. It does not follow, however, that a minor questions doctrine is not
worth pursuing. This Article’s central claim is that we should expect
stagnation to be most prevalent when the benefits of a policy are diffuse but
the costs are concentrated, especially if the policy is technical. Even without
Chevron’s collective-action problem, that is a tough combination. Yet
deference may make an already bad situation worse. 214
$!+F
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B. Why Hasn’t Congress Already Acted?
Of course, all of this raises a separate question: if minor questions are a
problem, why hasn’t Congress already responded? Congress can change

because a major policy may be revisited later does not mean that a court should not properly apply
the law during the interim. When the major questions doctrine should apply, however, is beyond
this Article’s scope.
209 For example, if the mutual inaction payoff in the matrix in Table 3 is changed from -1 to .01, the odds that anyone will act becomes vanishingly small. See supra Table 3.
210 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 12, at 666-67 (noting an issue involving foreign tax credits placed
by Democratic presidents in the Greenbook but not Republicans).
211 See Manning, supra note 51, at 200 (explaining the value of congressional participation
in policymaking).
212 See Hemel, supra note 12, at 644 (“Presidents will be more willing to raise revenue
unilaterally when Congress is strongly tax-averse, and Congress will be more willing to pass revenueraising legislation when the President is strongly tax-averse.”).
213 See supra Section III.A; see also Hemel, supra note 12, at 711 (“The static and dynamic effects
of deference cut in different directions: deference makes it more likely that any particular Treasury
regulation will pass judicial muster but less likely that Congress will act to raise revenues.”).
214 This answer also assumes for the sake of argument that more government action is a good
thing. As explained above, that assumption is the subject of debate. See, p. 1191, supra. The key point
for purposes here is that even if more action is good, deference may not always enable more action.
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Chevron. 215 So if deference creates a significant collective-action problem,
why hasn’t Congress already fixed it? In other words, doesn’t the fact that
Congress has not acted or even expressed alarm speak volumes? 216
This point is also well taken. There are, however, at least four answers.
First, it is not all clear that enough members of Congress have recognized the
systemic nature of the problem. It is possible to experience a collective-action
problem in a single case without recognizing that it applies in other cases,
too. If members of Congress do not realize that the same dynamic may arise
for many types of policies, it is easy to see why reform would be unattractive;
any individual minor question may be too small to justify the efforts
associated with reform. Second, Congress may know about this dynamic but
has concluded that the current framework is the best option and should be
retained. Third, Congress may know about this dynamic but believe, wrongly,
that there is no way out of it. And fourth, some in Congress may like this
collective-action dynamic because it helps sophisticated operators stop
legislation. 217 In other words, the very dynamic that give rise to collective
action problems for minor questions may also create pressure to keep that
system in place.
Which explanation (or explanations) is correct? We do not know.
Congress has not spoken one way or the other. Instead, the Supreme Court
has changed the status quo by creating Chevron without a clear statement from
Congress (although, to be sure, some deference existed before Chevron 218).
Because (i) Congress has not addressed the issue but (ii) both theory and
some real-world evidence suggest that a collective-action problem sometimes
may exist, it is not at all clear that congressional silence should equal consent.
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C. A More Realistic Understanding of Policymaking?
Another pushback challenges an assumption in this Article’s model, viz.,
that there are only two players in the game: Congress and the White House.
This may be true for high-profile issues (such as those addressed by the major
215 Because the theory of Chevron is implicit delegation, see, for example, United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001), Congress could withdraw that delegation anytime it chose.
See Scalia, supra note 28, at 517 (describing Chevron as “a background rule of law against which
Congress can legislate”).
216 See United States v. Lopez, 518 F.3d 790, 798 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining the “logical
significance of the dog that didn’t bark”); cf. MILAN M. ĆIRKOVIĆ, THE GREAT SILENCE: THE
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF FERMI’S PARADOX 2 (2018) (explaining the theory that if aliens
existed, “they would have been here already”).
217 For what it is worth, this fourth possibility seems improbable. Not only does it require a large
dose of cynicism, it is also quite elaborate. Even so, it may still be worth considering, even if the extreme
version of public-choice theory does not fit reality. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Has Awful
Effects, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 91 (2021) (discussing emergence of Chevron deference).
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questions doctrine or even some “ordinary” Chevron questions), 219 but
presumably it is much less often true for minor questions. Although the
“executive Power” is vested in the President alone, 220 no one argues that the
President is personally involved in every decision. 221 Countless decisions
involving minor questions are made at the agency level, often by career
officials. 222 There are also independent agencies whose decisions are, at least
in theory, isolated from presidential control. 223 Against this more accurate
backdrop, doesn’t it follow that in the real world, there is no meaningful
collective-action problem?
No. This Article uses the White House in its model because it is simpler.
But White House participation is not necessary for this Article’s conclusions
to hold. The collective-action problem can be between Congress and the
White House, but it can also be between Congress and an agency. The key
point is not who in the Executive Branch creates policy, but rather that
someone there can do so. That point does not change when we adopt a more
realistic view of policymaking.
To be sure, it is no doubt true that, say, a career agency official may assess
costs and benefits differently from a political appointee in the White
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219 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated
Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549, 606 (2018) (pointing
to white-collar enforcement in the Obama administration and deportation guidance in the Trump
administration); Kagan, supra note 126, at 2248 (pointing to health care, welfare reform, tobacco, and
guns in the Clinton administration).
220 See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020) (“Under
our Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President,’ who must ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, § 3)).
221 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“Although the Constitution empowers the President to keep federal officers accountable,
administrative agencies enjoy in practice a significant degree of independence. As scholars have
noted, ‘no President (or his executive office staff) could, and presumably none would wish to,
supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.’” (quoting Kagan, supra note 126, at 2250)).
222 See, e.g., Adoption of Recommendations, Admin. Conference of U.S., 84 Fed. Reg. 71,348,
71,354-55 (Dec. 27, 2019) (explaining that “SES officials often . . . exercise ‘important policy-making,
policy-determining, or other executive functions’” and that “[a]pproximately half of SES positions
are reserved for career employees”).
223 See, e.g., Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203-04 (explaining independent agencies, i.e., those
subject to a weaker presidential removal power). How independent many “independent” agencies
are in practice is disputed. See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies:
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 491 (2008) (questioning
the amount of agency independence in a polarized age); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of
Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 513 (1985) (“The
distinction between executive branch and independent agencies continues to thrive in political
rhetoric, but it has virtually no life in the reality of agency practice.”). To the extent that agency
independence is more theoretical than real, this objection loses force.
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House. 224 If so, this may change how often a collective-action problem occurs,
but it would not eliminate the risk altogether, especially for policies without
sharp political significance. Moreover, technical issues—which, as this Article
explains, also can create a minor-questions collective-action problem—are
hard to address. A career official may prefer not to expend the energy on a
technical issue that will not advance his or her career, especially when
someone else could do it. 225 Or less cynically, a career official may not be
especially interested in some issue. At the margins, that person may be more
inclined to act if no one else could. But if someone else could, that official
may stand aside. Of course, career officials may (or may not 226) be more
public-interest minded than political officials, which would make collectiveaction dynamics less likely. They may also be more attentive to congressional
wishes. 227 But all of this would merely change the frequency of the problem,
not its existence.
At the same time, adding more players to the mix—Congress, the White
House, an agency or agencies 228, and different groups within agencies—may
make the collective-action problem even more serious. This Article uses a twoplayer model because it is simpler. But a model with more decisionmakers could
be more susceptible to freeriding. It is a familiar insight in antitrust that the
more players involved, the harder it is to prevent self-interested behavior by
individuals within the group. 229 Adding more policymakers into the model thus
potentially may lead to more freeriding, not less. 230
Alternatively, what if we take a more realistic view of relative
policymaking capacity? In particular, Congress is subject to bicameralism and
$$&F

$$'F

$$(F

$$)F

$$*F

$$+F

$%!F

224 See Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against
Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129, 131 (2013) (“Scholarship has long documented deep divisions
within agencies and, more importantly, between political appointees and career staff.”).
225 See Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1268-69 (2015)
(explaining the incentives officials have to maximize their own interests).
226 See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
1, 36-37 (2014) (explaining that “bureaucrats [may] care more for routine than for results” and
develop “vast bureaucratic mechanisms” as ends unto themselves (quotations omitted)). Once more,
the truth may be somewhere in the middle. This is another empirical question.
227 See Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1430-31 (2017)
(explaining how attentive officials are to congressional requests).
228 See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (“[A] social ill is less likely to be addressed by regulatory action [where there
is overlapping policymaking authority than] where a particular institution is viewed by all as having
regulatory primacy.”). But see Freeman & Rossi, supra note 134, at 1151-55 (defending redundancy).
229 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 192-93 (5th ed. 2016) (describing the freeriding problem and
self-interested behavior in the context of cartels).
230 See OLSON, supra note 104, at 2-3 (explaining that collective-action problems are worse for
larger groups).
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presentment 231; agencies are not. 232 Thus, because it is harder for Congress
to act, won’t the executive branch realize that it should act rather than waiting
for Congress? Perhaps, but likely not. In fact, the harder it is for Congress to
act, the more inaction we should expect (all else being held constant). 233
Granted, Congress has other means to force action—such as its power over
budgets 234 and general oversight functions 235—and as the costs of new
legislation increase for Congress, it may be more willing to use these means.
But again, this should just change the frequency of the collective-action
dynamic, not its existence. How often inaction occurs (or, put another way,
how powerful Congress’s other means of spurring regulatory action are) is
another empirical question that has not been answered. 236
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D. Are There Better Solutions?
Even if Chevron causes a collective-action problem, are there not better
ways to solve it? As noted above, culture—including fairness and cooperation
norms 237—can mitigate collective-action problems. So might not fairness and
$%)F

231 U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3; see also Manning, supra note 51, at 198 (elaborating on
these requirements).
232 Agencies might, however, be subject to an ossified rulemaking process. See, e.g., Nielson,
Sticky Regulations, supra note 194194, at 89 (explaining the empirical debate about the extent to which
procedural requirements impede agency action).
233 In terms of the Snowdrift Game, when action becomes relatively less attractive, the
incentive to stay in the car increases for one of the players. Both intuitively and mathematically,
there is no reason to think that the decreased incentive to act for one player will be entirely offset
by a change in the other player’s strategy. Holding the payoffs from action constant (as we must),
the only implication of moving from a world of symmetrical costs to a world of asymmetrical costs
in which one party’s costs have increased while the other party’s costs have remained constant along
all relevant dimensions is a reduced overall likelihood of action.
Notably, the inverse is also true; if it becomes easier for one player to act while everything
remains constant for the other player, we should expect less inaction. Applied here, this would mean
that if, say, Congress could increase its policymaking capacity in a way that would allow the costs of
congressional action to decrease, then we should expect less stagnation. As explained above, however,
there may be limits on Congress’s ability to increase its policymaking capacity. See supra note 138.
And needless to say, for such increased capacity to make sense, the benefits of that capacity increase
would have to be greater than its costs.
234 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Essay, The Federal Trade Commission as an
Independent Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2085, 2104 (2015)
(recounting how a threat to reduce funding for DOJ and FTC changed agency behavior).
235 See, e.g., Christopher M. Davis et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv. RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT MANUAL (2020) (discussing how Congress may exercise oversight).
236 To be sure, if Congress could always prevent the collective-action dynamic discussed in this
Article through non-legislative, (arguably) low-cost tools like oversight hearings and budget threats,
then those tools themselves could be a viable alternative to a minor questions doctrine. Professor
Hemel’s real-world tax examples from the Greenbook, however, at least suggests that such tools may
not always be sufficient. See pp. 1214–15, supra.
237 This idea that there are fairness norms against which negotiating parties act is supported
by the literature surrounding the so-called “ultimatum game,” in which two parties negotiate over a
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cooperation norms mitigate Chevron’s collective-action problem? This
counterargument is fair but not dispositive. Are there such norms? And if so,
are they strong enough to solve the collective-action problem or do they just
make it less common?
Alternatively, rather than relying on fairness and cooperation norms,
Congress could solve the collective-action problem by taking away an agency’s
ability to stand down. If an agency must address a problem, there will not be
stagnation. Yet there are many good reasons why agencies choose not to act.
Agencies regularly stand aside, for example, not because of collective-action
dynamics, but instead because they don’t want the policy at all and would
oppose it even if there was no collective-action problem. In other words, they
have a dominant strategy not to act. It is only when the agency doesn’t act
because of collective-action dynamics, however, that we should be
concerned. 238 It is difficult to identify that sort of policy ex ante or
categorically. Congress, of course, could solve this problem through targeted
legislation after a collective-action dynamic emerges—but if Congress is
going to do that, why not just create the policy? 239
Taking a more realistic view of agencies (as explained above), another
potential solution could be self-policing by the Executive Branch. If agencies
are trying to freeride off of other agencies with overlapping jurisdiction or
off of Congress (which by definition has overlapping jurisdiction), perhaps
oversight by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within
the White House’s Office of Management and Budget could spur agency
$%*F

$%+F

surplus. Studies suggest that notions of fairness may lead to a more even distribution. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSPS., Autumn 1998, at 195, 19798 (describing experiments that suggest that generous offers in the ultimatum game are best
explained by fairness concerns). That said, the robustness of that “fairness” effect may dissipate in
certain situations, such as litigation. See Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, Fairness in an Embedded
Ultimatum Game, 53 J.L. & ECON. 263, 264 (2010) (“Our results suggest that fairness considerations
are a good deal less important in stylized legal bargaining than in the simple ultimatum game.”).
238 There are also important Article II issues. It not always clear that Congress could force the
Executive Branch to act. Questions about the relationship between the Take Care Clause and the
Executive Vesting Clause are beyond this Article’s scope. For a discussion of when the executive
branch may properly decline to enforce the law, see, for example, Jack Goldsmith & John F.
Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1863-64 (2016); Zachary S. Price,
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 674-75 (2014).
239 Another possible solution would be for Congress to create a mechanism to disable itself
when a collective-action problem emerges. The problem with this solution is two-fold. First, if
Congress is going to expend that effort, it arguably should just address the policy issue. Second,
Congress often cannot bind itself, at least not very well. Partisan divide may act as a commitment
mechanism against legislative action for some policies (such as major questions or other political
ones), but that effect is less pronounced for minor questions. Notably, the fact that Congress cannot
irrevocably “turn off ” its legislative power is almost certainly a good thing, even if it means that
Congress cannot unilaterally end a collective-action problem. See Manning, supra note 51, at 200
(explaining how a multicameral system acts as a safeguard against “oppressive legislation”).
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action. Just as OIRA reviews the most important regulations, 240 perhaps it
would also be directed by executive order or statute to target freeriding for
minor ones. There is much to be said for this option—at least for issues that
do not involve the White House itself (such as Hemel’s tax examples from
the Greenbook). Unfortunately, adding more responsibility to its portfolio
would stretch OIRA’s resources even further, especially if agencies actively
avoid review. 241 OIRA review, although perhaps part of the solution, is thus
not a panacea. Similar things can be said about ombudsmen, such as the
Taxpayer Advocate Service with the Internal Revenue Service. 242 Such
entities may help to identify issues that the agency is not addressing but, as
Hemel’s tax examples demonstrate, do not appear to be a silver bullet.
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E. What About Delegation Generally?
Finally, if Chevron creates a collective-action problem by empowering
two branches to share the same policymaking space, then don’t all
delegations also do the same? Yet delegated authority is everywhere. 243 So
why worry about Chevron?
It is true that this Article’s logic suggests that delegation generally 244 also
enables collective-action dynamics. Because agencies can regulate, say, in the
“public interest,” 245 Congress may do less than it otherwise would, and
agencies, in turn, may reciprocate. This effect of delegation no doubt merits
extended attention. But it does now follow that we should not also worry
about Chevron. In fact, there are a couple of reasons to focus on Chevron in
particular. First, Chevron is more manageable. How courts should enforce the
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240 See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1850 (2013) (explaining that “OIRA review is limited to
‘significant’ regulatory actions,” which includes rules with “a major economic impact or raise serious
policy questions” but excludes rules that are “simple and routine”).
241 See Nou, supra note 126, at 1817 (noting “a decline” in OIRA’s resources which enables
agencies to avoid review); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1013 (2011) (noting that
“OIRA’s scarce resources” make it difficult to prevent such avoidance).
242 See Bryan T. Camp, What Good Is the National Taxpayer Advocate?, 126 TAX NOTES 1243,
1249 (2010) (explaining how the office works and the complex balance of power between the office
and the Internal Revenue Service).
243 See Metzger, supra note 3, at 7 (“[T]he broad delegations of authority to the executive
branch that represent the central reality of contemporary national government.”).
244 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (“In short, we have
‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). But see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to rethink its approach).
245 See Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943, 992 (2017) [Nielson,
Beyond Seminole Rock] (“[S]ome statutes—like those that authorize regulation ‘in the public
interest’—do not present meaningful questions of statutory interpretation.”).
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nondelegation doctrine is difficult. 246 By contrast, it should be more
straightforward to mitigate Chevron’s collective-action problem. And second,
delegation involves an express choice by Congress. Deference, by contrast, is
more a creature of the judiciary. It is one thing for Congress to create a
collective-action problem for itself. It is something else for courts to spring
one on Congress. 247
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There are no doubt other counterarguments. None of the most obvious ones,
however, defeat the need for a minor questions doctrine—at least based on what
we know so far. Unfortunately, uncertainty in administrative law is par for the
course. We don’t know much about many things. 248 This means we must make
an educated guess about the key empirical question. Because this Article offers
a coherent theory backed by real-world examples, we should be confident that
there isn’t a significant collective-action problem before simply accepting the
status quo. At a minimum, targeted empirical study is necessary.
$&*F

CONCLUSION
“[I]t takes chutzpah to write about Chevron.” 249 It takes even more
chutzpah to say we have overlooked something important for decades. But
that is what this Article contends. Under a reasonable set of assumptions, we
should expect that Chevron sometimes stymies policymaking. Thus, whatever
one thinks of the usual back-and-forth about Chevron, the story is more
complicated. Because both branches can act, and because both would prefer the
other do so, each may shirk.
$&+F

246 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (explaining “the inherent difficulty of line-drawing” vis-à-vis delegations).
247 To be sure, although not the focus this Article, the analysis here has implications for the
nondelegation debate. For example, it suggests that Congress should evaluate delegations through
the lens of collective-action dynamics. Cf. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as
Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 898 (2001). And if Congress does not want to
withdraw delegated power altogether, it can authorize the Executive Branch to forswear statutory
authority. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 124, at 339-40.
248 See, e.g., Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, supra note 245, at 979, 984 (explaining that
scholars lack data on key administrative law questions); Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power,
109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 693 (2015) (explaining the distinction between “informational” and
“conceptual” problems in administrative law); cf. Paul R. Verkuil, The Self-Legitimating Bureaucracy,
93 YALE L.J. 780, 780 (1984) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983)) (“It
is as if, when asked the question what (or where) is administrative justice, [most lawyers and
policymakers] look for that particular lost coin under the proverbial streetlight of judicial process,
not because the coin is there, but because that is where the light is.”).
249 Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (2015).
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If this “collective action” account is correct, then no matter one’s priors
about the administrative state, deference’s place in it becomes more
complicated. And this is especially true for minor questions, which, not by
accident, do not receive much attention anyway. Those who embrace Chevron
because they believe it facilitates good policy must also confront the
possibility that it may also do the opposite. Sometimes deference allows
agencies to act when Congress has overlooked a problem. And sometimes it
facilitates the emergence of policy that Congress does not want, which is
problematic for other reasons. 250 But deference also may prevent beneficial
policies from becoming law in the first place. In making an overall assessment
of Chevron, it is incomplete to simply point to the good things it enables; one
must also consider the good things it may prevent.
Accordingly, although the high-profile debate about major questions is
important, we should not lose sight of the complete picture. Major questions
are significant and will continue to be so. Yet counterintuitively, when it
comes to deference, “humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff ” 251 may turn out to be
no less significant. The Chevron debate overlooks this point. That is why the
time has come to consider a minor questions doctrine.
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250 See Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2010) (noting the “legitimacy” problems associated with “permitting
unelected officials to create binding legal texts”).
251 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013).
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